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ABSTRACT
The legal profession is losing its authority over the regulation of legal
services. Recent changes in antitrust law have put state bar associations
under a spotlight. Competition from technology companies and concerns
about access to justice have increased political pressure for market
liberalization. Independent research is challenging the unique value of
lawyers’ services, even in formal legal proceedings, and this research is
increasingly well-organized and well-funded at the national level. The
organized bar is asleep at the wheel and ill-prepared to respond.
This Article argues that the United States is moving toward evidencebased lawyer regulation, and suggests strategies for equipping the bar to
contribute to evidence-based policy-making. It focuses specifically on
strategies for institutionalizing independent research norms within the
profession and promoting research as an essential component of
professional self-regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2017, the South Carolina Bar House of Delegates passed a
“Resolution on Court-Centered Regulation of Legal Services,”1 in which
the Bar emphasized the power of state supreme courts to regulate legal
services,2 adopted the principle that the delivery of legal services must be
conducted “under the auspices of lawyers,”3 and petitioned the South
Carolina Supreme Court to adopt a rule regulating the delivery of legal
forms.4 The proposed rule provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny legal form
available to the public for self-completion or completion with assistance of
a scrivener for profit must be prepared or approved by a lawyer authorized
to practice law by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.”5
What problem is this rule designed to solve? One might imagine that the

1.
S.C. BAR, HOUSE OF DELEGATES MEETING MATERIALS 45 (May 18, 2017), https://www.scb
ar.org/media/filer_public/38/4f/384f6c75-977f-4bce-8154-f2f2f1fb2b35/may17hodmats.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/LH6S-KV7U] [hereinafter MEETING MATERIALS].
2.
Id. (“S.C. Code 40-5-10 recognizes the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the
practice of law . . . .”).
3.
Id. (“[T]he South Carolina Bar adopts the principle that the delivery of legal services to
persons and entities must be conducted under the auspices of lawyers (‘licensed’ or ‘authorized’ or
‘regulated’) by the Supreme Court . . . .”).
4.
Id. at 45–46.
5.
Petition at 3, In Re: Court Regulation of Forms for Use in Legal Matters (S.C.) (on file with
author).
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goal of the rule is consumer protection: that consumers are increasingly
vulnerable to the provision of low-quality legal forms by non-lawyers—in
particular, by commercial providers such as LegalZoom6—thus, the
proposed rule is necessary for quality control. Many lawyers in good faith
believe that commercial and paraprofessional competitors provide subpar
products and services and pose a risk to consumers.7 The South Carolina
Bar emphasized the need for consumer protection in the final version of its
petition.8
Alternatively, one might imagine that the goal of the rule is lawyer
protection: that lawyers are increasingly vulnerable to competition from
alternative providers; thus, the proposed rule is necessary to shore up
judicial protection for lawyers’ monopoly over legal services. Many
commentators in good faith believe that the evidence—if we had it—would
show that lawyers’ traditional monopoly is overbroad, and that consumers
would benefit from increased competition in the legal services market.9 The
South Carolina Bar questioned this view in its petition.10
What evidence should state supreme courts consider in assessing the
need for anticompetitive regulation? And which side should bear the burden
of proof?11 Historically, courts have required little evidence in support of
lawyers’ monopoly claims.12 State supreme courts claim broad “inherent

6.
See, e.g., Medlock v. LegalZoom.Com, Inc., No. 2012-208067, 2013 S.C. LEXIS 362 (Oct.
18, 2013) (holding that LegalZoom’s self-help document services do not constitute the unauthorized
practice of law in South Carolina).
7.
See Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the Public?
Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2593–94 (2014)
(discussing lawyers’ perceptions of the risks posed to consumers by unauthorized legal practice).
8.
Petition, supra note 5, at 1–2. The original Resolution did not include any language about
consumer protection. See MEETING MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 45–46.
9.
See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 142 (1989) (arguing that the legal profession
has used the privilege of self-regulation to restrict competition); Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyers’
Monopoly—What Goes and What Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067, 3068–69 (2014) (arguing that
deregulation would “work out wonderfully for consumers”); Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and
Other Tales About the Superiority of Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2615 (2014) (stating that
“there is little evidence that lawyers are more effective at providing certain legal services or more ethical
than qualified nonlawyers”); Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 2605 (questioning whether “broad
prohibitions on unauthorized practice serve the public” and emphasizing the lack of evidence).
10.
Petition, supra note 5, at 1 (questioning the desirability of expanding “nontraditional legal
services”).
11.
See Laurel S. Terry, An “Issue Checklist” for the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice, in MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE: STAYING COMPETITIVE AND ADAPTING TO CHANGE 129,
131 (Gary A. Munneke & Ann L. MacNaughton eds., 1999) (recommending that those seeking to
preserve anticompetitive regulation bear the burden of proof since such regulation restricts client choice
and “all lawyer regulation should be justifiable”).
12.
See Gillian K. Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Services to Promote
Access, Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1214 (2016) (“American
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powers” to regulate the practice of law13 and have proved to be a friendly
forum for lawyers’ claims of exclusive competence.14 A national survey of
the regulation of the unauthorized practice of law found that courts typically
“make[] sweeping assertions about the potential for injury” from nonlawyer providers without offering any evidence.15 Moreover, though state
supreme courts play an active role in formal regulatory enforcement, such
as lawyer disciplinary proceedings and prosecutions for unauthorized
practice, courts have delegated most other regulatory authority to
committees of practicing lawyers, who police the boundaries of their own
monopoly with little supervision.16
This practice of unsupervised delegation has drawn increasing antitrust
scrutiny from the Department of Justice17 and finally was upended by the
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission.18 N.C. Dental involved an
antitrust challenge to the state dental board’s campaign against commercial
teeth whitening.19 The board, made up primarily of dentists, had issued

unauthorized practice enforcement is not dependent on actual client harm. Nor do American discussions
of regulatory reform rest on evidence of probabilities and harms.” (citation omitted)).
13.
Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against “Legal Bootleggers”—The Role of the
Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Courts’ Inherent Powers in the Early Twentieth Century, 46 CAL.
W. L. REV. 65, 118 (2009) [hereinafter Rigertas, Legal Bootleggers] (discussing the expansion of the
inherent powers doctrine in the 1930s and 1940s).
14.
See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
133 (2011) (noting that “state supreme courts are uniquely vulnerable to lobbying by lawyers” and
“inaccessible to lobbying by the public”); Laurel A. Rigertas, Stratification of the Legal Profession: A
Debate in Need of a Public Forum, 2012 J. PROF. LAW. 79, 82–83 [hereinafter Rigertas, Stratification]
(arguing that the exclusion of legislative and public participation in lawyer regulation has stifled
innovation in the legal services market).
15.
Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 2603; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 33–34 (1981) (reporting the results of a national survey of unauthorized practice enforcement
finding that only 11 percent of reported cases involved evidence of consumer injury).
16.
BARTON, supra note 14, at 137–38 (“State supreme courts have satisfied their own and
lawyers’ interests by delegating virtually all their regulatory authority . . . back to lawyers.”); Hadfield
& Rhode, supra note 12, at 1217 n.88 (“[M]ost regulatory oversight and intervention is carried out by
bar committees composed entirely of practicing attorneys who open investigations and send out
warnings or cease and desist letters without state court oversight . . . .”).
17.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTS TO STATES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/comments-states.html
[https://perma.cc/8CGX-2B7N]
(providing links to comment letters concerning bar regulatory activity); see also Laurel S. Terry, Putting
the Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law in a Global Context, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
2903, 2934 (2014) (discussing the Department of Justice’s growing concern with the scope of the legal
profession’s monopoly, as evidenced by a series of comment letters to state bar associations and
legislatures).
18.
135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (“N.C. Dental”).
19.
Id. at 1104.
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cease-and-desist letters to non-dentist teeth whiteners, leading non-dentists
to stop offering teeth whitening services in North Carolina.20 The question
was whether the board’s actions were protected by state-action antitrust
immunity,21 as defined in a series of cases beginning with Parker v.
Brown.22 The Court held that the board—though defined by statute as an
“agency of the State”23—was not entitled to state-action immunity, because
the board was controlled by active market participants without adequate
state supervision.24 N.C. Dental thereby narrowed the scope of state-action
immunity for professional licensing boards and exposed “vast areas of state
regulation to new antitrust scrutiny.”25
N.C. Dental has significant implications for lawyer regulation. Most
immediately, it alters the balance of power between lawyers and their
competitors, by exposing the lawyers on regulatory committees to “huge
potential antitrust liability.”26 Although state supreme courts, acting in their
sovereign capacity, are immune from federal antitrust law27—for instance,
when they adopt rules of professional conduct28—N.C. Dental limits stateaction immunity “when the State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to
active market participants”29 such as practicing lawyers. To claim stateaction immunity after N.C. Dental, bar committees must show that their
regulatory activities are subject to “active supervision” by the state.30 Thus,
in order to shield bar committee members from antitrust liability, N.C.
Dental requires state supreme courts to provide active supervision of bar
regulatory activity,31 in effect imposing a signing requirement on what was

20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 1107.
22.
317 U.S. 341 (1943) (holding that state regulatory action is immune from federal antitrust
law).
23.
N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1120 (Alito, J., dissenting).
24.
Id. at 1104 (majority opinion).
25.
Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The New Antitrust Federalism, 102 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1387,
1407–09 (2016).
26.
Marcia Coyle, State AGs Urged to Enforce Licensing Board Decision, NAT’L L.J., May 6,
2015.
27.
N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1110 (stating that the decisions of a state supreme court, acting
legislatively rather than judicially, are an undoubted exercise of state sovereign authority).
28.
See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977) (explaining that acts of the
sovereign are immune from antitrust scrutiny).
29.
N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1111.
30.
Id. at 1117 (“If a State wants to rely on active market participants as regulators, it must
provide active supervision . . . .”).
31.
Id. at 1105 (“Parker immunity requires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign
actors, especially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession, result from procedures
that suffice to make it the State’s own.”).
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previously informal, interstitial regulation.32
N.C. Dental also signaled a heightened standard for “active supervision”
review.33 Although the case presented no specific supervisory systems for
review,34 in dicta, the Court outlined a substantive, versus merely
procedural, standard, stating that “[t]he supervisor must review the
substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures
followed to produce it.”35 The Court also cited antitrust scholarship calling
professional licensing boards “cartels by another name” and urging the
Court to put licensing boards “under the Sherman Act’s microscope.”36
Thus, most commentators read N.C. Dental as tightening the standard for
“active supervision” and signaling the need to produce a record of
substantive, evidence-based review.37
The American Bar Association (ABA) also has increased the pressure on
state supreme courts to become more proactive and data-driven in assessing
the need for anticompetitive regulation. In February 2016, the ABA House
of Delegates adopted Model Regulatory Objectives for the Provision of
Legal Services to guide courts in their regulation of “non-traditional legal
service providers.”38 Viewed by opponents as a subversive effort to
recognize non-lawyer providers,39 the move also reflected proponents’
desire to guide the profession’s regulatory authority over non-lawyer
competitors—in particular, technology companies and online, commercial

32.
Id. (explaining that active supervision requires the State “to review and approve interstitial
policies made by the entity claiming immunity”).
33.
Id. at 1116–17.
34.
Id. at 1116 (“The Board does not claim that the State exercised active, or indeed any,
supervision over its conduct . . . and, as a result, no specific supervisory systems can be reviewed here.”).
35.
Id. (citing Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 102–03 (1988)).
36.
Id. (citing Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2014)); Edlin & Haw, supra note 36,
at 1144.
37.
See, e.g., Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1413 (stating that “[t]he ‘active supervision’
requirement . . . [was] tightened up . . . by [the] dicta in NC Dental”).
38.
ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES RES. 105 (Feb. 2016) (adopted), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016mymres/105.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WHE-3RH9] [hereinafter
Resolution 105].
39.
See Lorelei Laird, ABA House Approves Model Regulatory Objectives for Nontraditional
Legal Services, ABA J. (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/house_approves_propo
sed_model_regulatory_objectives_for_nontraditional_lega [https://perma.cc/SX85-LYKP] (discussing
opponents’ concerns that the adoption of regulatory objectives would signal an endorsement of nonlawyer providers). The Model Regulatory Objectives were the work of the ABA Commission on the
Future of Legal Services, which emphasized the need for innovation in the delivery of legal services.
See ABA COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES IN
THE UNITED STATES 6–7 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016
FLSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5D6-HFXC].
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platforms for legal services.40 In the words of then-immediate past ABA
President William C. Hubbard, who championed the measure, “We’re not
going to put the Internet back in a bottle . . . . Let’s stand up and lead.”41
The ABA’s adoption of regulatory objectives invites the production of
empirical data and research to assess the costs and benefits of
anticompetitive professional regulation. A shift to evidence-based argument
already is apparent in calls for “smarter”42 regulation as a middle ground
between lawyers’ traditional monopoly and unregulated competition.
“Evidence-based” regulation has also gained traction in other jurisdictions43
and professions.44
But if, as this Article argues, pressure for evidence-based regulation is
increasing, the next question is how this plays out. Calling something
“evidence-based” does not make it so; it merely shifts the terms of debate.
Lawyers tend to view N.C. Dental as imposing a burden of production; that
is, the need to “make a record that justifies the regulatory action,”45 without
necessarily evaluating the quality of the data. Researchers, meanwhile, have
labored for decades to bring rigorous, independent research to bear on the

40.
ABA COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 39, at 60 (“[G]iven that
providers of legal assistance other than lawyers are already actively serving the American public, it is
especially timely and important for the ABA to offer guidance in this area.”).
41.
Laird, supra note 39 (quoting Hubbard).
42.
Lauren Moxley, Note, Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights Approach to
Reforming the Lawyer’s Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 553, 556
(2015) (“Rather than deregulating the market for legal services, . . . the next step ought to involve . . . .
[s]marter regulations that . . . can protect consumer rights while embracing the democratizing potential
of online legal technology.”); see also Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of Legal Services, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 49, 88 (2015) (calling for a regulatory system “that falls somewhere between the
United Kingdom approach, where people who lack a law license are afforded considerable freedom to
operate without any regulatory oversight, and the United States approach, where such individuals are
often forbidden to engage in many kinds of law-related work”).
43.
See, e.g., Evidence-Based Reform, AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, https://
www.alrc.gov.au/publications/1-introduction-inquiry/evidence-based-reform [https://perma.cc/PXQ2MFH9] (“Law reform recommendations cannot be based upon assertion or assumption and need to be
anchored in an appropriate evidence base.”); SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., RESEARCH AND
REPORTS, https:// www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports.page [https://perma.cc/QR9A-VHAC] (last
updated May 2019) (providing an index to research and quarterly reports on regulatory activities); see
also Laurel S. Terry, The European Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional
Services, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 91 (2009) (discussing the implications of EU initiatives on
competition in professional services); Terry, supra note 17, at 2904 (noting that regulators face
increasing pressure for “comparative benchmarking” with other countries).
44.
See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, Evidence-Based Access to Justice, 13 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE
295 (2009–2010) (discussing the move toward evidence-based practice in medicine, social services,
education, and criminal justice).
45.
Mark W. Merritt, Lessons Learned from the NC Dental Board Decision by a State Bar Officer
and Antitrust Lawyer, 24 PROF. LAW. 9 (2017).
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regulation of lawyers, and such efforts recently have made a resurgence,46
including at some elite law schools.47 N.C. Dental and the ABA’s adoption
of model regulatory objectives create new pressure—and a pulpit—for such
research and debates about its implications. The choice for the bar is no
longer a choice between assessment and no assessment, but rather a choice
about the terms of assessment and the profession’s authority in that debate.
This Article argues that the profession’s authority over the regulation of
legal services increasingly will require a commitment to evidence-based
regulation, and outlines strategies for institutionalizing that commitment.
One set of strategies is aimed at state supreme courts, which play an
important hortatory as well as authoritative role. Another is aimed at law
schools, particularly professional responsibility and clinical faculty, as
those faculty are central to the field; but also deans and the directors of
research centers associated with law schools. A final set of strategies is
aimed at the ABA and state bar associations, which could play a pivotal role
in brokering the terms of assessment for “non-traditional legal service
providers”48—and thereby for lawyers as well.
Part I explains how N.C. Dental and the ABA Model Regulatory
Objectives increase legal and political pressure for evidence-based
regulation. Part II examines existing research on the costs and benefits of
monopoly regulation and recent efforts to promote the rigor and
independence of such research. Part III suggests strategies for
institutionalizing evidence-based policy-making within the profession and
promoting research as an essential component of professional selfregulation.

46.
See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access
to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101 (discussing the increasing momentum in “Access to Justice (A2J)”
research and defining an expanded research agenda); Elizabeth Chambliss et al., Introduction: What We
Know and Need to Know About the State of “Access to Justice” Research, 67 S.C. L. REV. 193 (2016)
(reviewing recent academic and government research on access to justice and urging further investment
in the field); D. James Greiner, The New Legal Empiricism & Its Application to Access-to-Justice
Inquiries, 148 DÆDALUS 64 (2019) (calling for a “new legal empiricism” in access to justice policymaking and research).
47.
See, e.g., Access to Justice Lab Launches at HLS, CYBERLAW CLINIC (Sept. 16, 2016), https:/
/clinic.cyber.harvard.edu/2016/09/16/access-to-justice-lab-launches-at-hls/ [https://perma.cc/8KWK-J
ZRK] (stating that the lab will “develop[] evidence-based approaches to help courts and legal services
providers understand what works in improving access to justice”); see also Elizabeth Chambliss, When
Do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for “Empirical Legal Studies,” 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 17, 24 (2008) (discussing the importance of associations with elite law schools for the authority
of sociolegal research).
48.
Resolution 105, supra note 38.
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I. PRESSURE FOR EVIDENCE-BASED REGULATION
Unlike other U.S. professions, the legal profession is regulated primarily
by the judicial, rather than the legislative, branch.49 Since the 1930s, state
supreme courts have asserted broad, inherent powers to define and regulate
the practice of law, reasoning that judicial control over lawyers is necessary
to protect the functioning and independence of the courts.50 Although
numerous scholars have questioned the foundations and boundaries of the
inherent powers doctrine,51 and the doctrine has faced intermittent
challenges on both separation-of-powers52 and federalism53 grounds, so far,

49.
In California, the legislature plays an unusually active role. See STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL.,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUES AND STANDARDS 749 (2015); Rigertas, Legal Bootleggers, supra
note 13, at 119 n.244 (noting that “California still permits its legislature to carve out exceptions to what
might otherwise be considered the practice of law”). But see Rigertas, Stratification, supra note 14, at
116 (noting that, in most states, “a legislative act that defined the practice of law . . . would face a
successful constitutional challenge”).
50.
See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 22–33 (1986) (discussing the scope
and origins of courts’ inherent powers to regulate the practice of law); Rigertas, Legal Bootleggers,
supra note 13, at 118 (discussing the expansion of the inherent powers doctrine in the 1930s); see also
ABA COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201A TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mjp_
migrated/201a.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA94-TDYB] (affirming the ABA’s “support for the principle of
state judicial regulation of the practice of law”).
51.
See Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law:
An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 553 (1983) (questioning the doctrinal foundations of the
inherent powers doctrine); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who
Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167,
1208 (2003) (arguing that state supreme courts are subject to regulatory capture by lawyers); Roger C.
Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies over the AntiContact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 308 (1992) (referring to the inherent powers
doctrine as “a curious and anomalous aspect of the law”); Rigertas, Legal Bootleggers, supra note 13,
at 71–72 (questioning the constitutional foundation for courts’ exclusive power to define the practice of
law); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 857 (1992) (arguing
that enforcement of professional norms by other branches of government “poses no credible threat to
either a formalist or a functionalist understanding of the separation of powers”); Charles W. Wolfram,
Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 1, 4 (1989–90) [hereinafter Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation] (arguing that
courts’ power to regulate should not be exclusive); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73
TEX. L. REV. 335, 365 (1994) (rejecting the argument that state ethics rules may not be preempted by
federal law).
52.
See Rigertas, Stratification, supra note 14, at 118 (reviewing early clashes between state
legislatures and courts over the power to define the practice of law); Polly Ross Hughes, Bill to Lay
Down the Law on Self-Help Software—Controversial Measure Reversing Statewide Ban is Awaiting
Gov. Bush’s Signature, HOUS. CHRON., June 13, 1999, at 1 (discussing a potential separation of powers
challenge to legislation allowing the sale of self-help legal software in Texas).
53.
See Cramton & Udell, supra note 51, at 292 (discussing “[t]he clash between the bar and the
Justice Department” over the no contact and subpoena rules); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of
Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?,
64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 475 (1996) (discussing the Department of Justice’s 1994 Thornburgh
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state supreme courts and competing regulators have avoided a constitutional
showdown.54
The inherent powers doctrine has two aspects: an affirmative aspect that
asserts judicial authority to regulate lawyers even in the absence of enabling
language in the state constitution or statutes,55 and a negative aspect that
treats lawyer regulation as the exclusive prerogative of the courts.56 The
negative power is more controversial, particularly courts’ exclusive power
to define the “practice of law.”57 By controlling the definition of the practice
of law, state supreme courts control not only the boundaries of lawyers’
market monopoly,58 but also the boundaries of courts’ regulatory monopoly
under the inherent powers doctrine.59 Moreover, because courts define the
practice of law on a state-by-state, case-by-case basis, these monopoly
claims are largely insulated from organized public scrutiny.60
Under Parker, state regulatory action is immune from federal antitrust
law;61 thus, judicial regulation of lawyers is immune from antitrust
scrutiny.62 Before N.C. Dental, most bar regulatory activity also was treated

Memorandum, which “posed a challenge to the constitutional authority of courts to regulate federal
prosecutors”).
54.
See Barton, supra note 9, at 3089 (“Truly aggressive moves would be likely to draw federal
antitrust and congressional attention.”); Rigertas, Stratification, supra note 14, at 116 (noting that state legislative
efforts to regulate legal services have been “very constrained”); Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer
Regulation, supra note 51, at 16 (noting that courts sometimes hold that a statute technically violates the inherent
powers doctrine, but “will forebear striking it down because the court agrees with the policy objectives . . . . and
in the spirit of comity”).
55.
See WOLFRAM, supra note 50, at 25–26 (stating that the origins of the inherent powers
doctrine are “not entirely clear”).
56.
Id. at 27–30 (discussing and critiquing the negative inherent powers doctrine).
57.
See Rigertas, Stratification, supra note 14, at 124 (questioning the constitutional basis of
courts’ exclusive power to define the practice of law); Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation,
supra note 51, at 4 (arguing that courts’ authority to define the practice of law should not be exclusive).
58.
See Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation, supra note 51, at 17 (noting that
“lawyers, and only lawyers, define the extent to which the legal profession will face economic
competition. . . . because only lawyers control the process of defining the unauthorized practice of law”).
59.
See WOLFRAM, supra note 50, at 24 (stating that the negative power “carries obvious risks
of judicial abuse” and, carried to the extreme, “asserts that a court is not subject to rules in this area”);
Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly: Failing To Protect Consumers, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2683, 2697 (2014) (noting that “there is no legislative process for outsiders to lobby and seek
changes to the scope of the legal profession’s monopoly”).
60.
See BARTON, supra note 14, at 134 (discussing “[t]he lack of state supreme court
accountability for lawyer regulation”); Rigertas, Legal Bootleggers, supra note 13, at 68 (arguing that
the bar strategically lobbied for judicial regulation in the 1930s as a means of monopoly protection);
Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation, supra note 51, at 18 (stating that, by claiming the
exclusive power to define the unauthorized practice of law, the legal profession has “both identified and
‘protected’ the interests of clients and the public without permitting them to participate in any way”).
61.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (holding that state regulatory action is immune
from federal antitrust law).
62.
See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977) (holding that acts of the

2019]

EVIDENCE-BASED LAWYER REGULATION

307

as protected state action, as long as the bar could be viewed as acting
pursuant to a delegation from the state supreme court.63 N.C. Dental,
however, raised the standard for political accountability under Parker,
signaling a “revolution”64 in antitrust federalism that has states scrambling
to adjust. The ABA’s passage of model regulatory objectives, likewise,
represents an effort to raise the standard of judicial review of professional
self-regulation. Taken together, these developments create pressure on state
supreme courts to rein in anticompetitive regulation—or defend it through
substantive, empirical review.
A. State-Action Antitrust Immunity After N.C. Dental
The Supreme Court has struggled to define the boundaries of state
immunity from federal antitrust law. The Sherman Act makes “[e]very
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” unlawful, and
does not expressly mention the states.65 Following the New Deal, however,
in Parker, the Court read a “state action” exemption into the Act to protect
state regulatory autonomy.66 The Court reasoned that, absent an explicit
purpose to “nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents,” the
Sherman Act could not be read to apply to the states in light of the “dual
system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are
sovereign.”67

sovereign are immune from antitrust scrutiny); Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting a challenge to anticompetitive provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
because the rules had been adopted by the state supreme court and therefore were protected state action);
Mass. Sch. of Law v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1036 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting a challenge to ABA
law school accreditation standards because such standards are only given force through state supreme
court requirements for bar admission).
63.
See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 361 (rejecting an antitrust challenge to state bar restrictions on
lawyer advertising because the Supreme Court of Arizona had approved the advertising restrictions in
question); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 572 (1984) (affirming the dismissal of an antitrust lawsuit
against the members of the state bar examination committee because the members were acting under the
authority of the state supreme court). But cf. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (holding
that the Virginia State Bar was acting in a private capacity when it encouraged lawyers to adhere to fee
schedules, because the Virginia Supreme Court had explicitly directed lawyers not to be controlled by
fee schedules).
64.
Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1389.
65.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
66.
See 317 U.S. at 351 (stating that the Sherman Act “makes no mention of the state as such,
and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state”); see
also Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1393 (noting that “[i]t has been observed that the Sherman
Act . . . ‘cannot mean what it says’” since, read literally, it would threaten state sovereignty (quoting
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978))).
67.
Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
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What counts as “state” action under Parker has proved tricky to define.
States legitimately delegate significant regulatory authority to other entities,
such as municipalities, state agencies, and state boards and committees
dominated by private actors.68 Yet, as the Parker Court noted, “a state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing
them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.”69 Subsequent
cases made clear that automatic immunity applies only when the state is
“acting as a sovereign,”70 through its legislature or state supreme court.71
When the state delegates regulatory authority to non-sovereign actors, those
actors must satisfy additional criteria in order to qualify for Parker
immunity.
The Court introduced the modern framework for Parker immunity in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.72 Midcal
held that, in order for non-sovereign actors to qualify for state-action
immunity, the regulation in question must be, first, “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy” and, second, “actively supervised”
by the State.73 This two-prong test is designed to prevent the state from
circumventing antitrust law by “casting . . . a gauzy cloak of state
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”74
However, public entities, such as municipalities, are only required to satisfy
the first prong of the Midcal test.75 In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,76
decided five years after Midcal, the Court created a shortcut for
municipalities,77 reasoning that “[w]here the actor is a municipality, there is
little or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement.”78

68.
See Edlin & Haw, supra note 36, at 1119–20 (“[S]tates rarely regulate economic activity
directly through a legislative act. Rather, states delegate rulemaking and rate-setting to agencies,
councils, or boards dominated by private citizens.”).
69.
Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
70.
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
71.
See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–68 (1984) (explaining that both state legislation
and “a decision of a state supreme court, acting legislatively rather than judicially,” are “ipso facto
exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws”).
72.
445 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1980) (holding that a statutory wine pricing program was not entitled
to state-action immunity because “the State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices
established by private parties”).
73.
Id. (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
74.
Id. at 106.
75.
See Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1400 (discussing the shortcut for sub-state entities); Sina
Safvati, Comment, Public-Private Divide in Parker State-Action Immunity, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1110,
1116–17 (2016) (discussing the evolution of the public-private divide under Midcal).
76.
471 U.S. 34 (1985).
77.
Id. at 47 (“We further hold that active state supervision is not a prerequisite to exemption
from the antitrust laws where the actor is a municipality rather than a private party.”).
78.
Id.
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The Hallie Court also suggested in a footnote that “[where] the actor is a
state agency, it is likely that active state supervision would also not be
required, although we do not here decide that issue.”79
Before N.C. Dental, most courts treated the Hallie dicta as law,80 holding
that professional licensing boards, as state agencies, are exempt from the
active supervision requirement, either automatically, based upon their
formal designation as state agencies,81 or in fact, based upon the presence
of “government-like attributes” such as open records and the “exercise of
governmental functions.”82 Thus, before N.C. Dental, professional licensing
boards were largely assumed to be immune from antitrust scrutiny, even if
a majority of the board were active market participants.83
N.C. Dental, however, signaled the end of this laissez-faire approach to
professional self-regulation. N.C. Dental held that state licensing boards
controlled by active market participants are subject to the same active
supervision requirement as private trade associations.84 As the Court stated:

79.
Id. at 46 n.10.
80.
Edlin & Haw, supra note 36, at 1124.
81.
See, e.g., Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033, 1041 (5th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the Louisiana Board of Certified Public Accountants, as a state agency, was
exempt from the active supervision requirement, citing Hallie); Porter Testing Lab. v. Bd. of Regents
for the Okla. Agric. & Mech. Colls., 993 F.2d 768, 772 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that active supervision
was unnecessary for a “constitutionally created state board, its executive secretary, and a state created
and funded university”); see also C. Douglas Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the Clear Articulation
Requirement for State Action Antitrust Immunity: The Case of State Agencies, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1059,
1063–64 (2000) (“Absent any definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts generally have
assumed that state agencies should be treated like municipalities and other subordinate governmental
units . . . . [and] not subject to the active supervision requirement . . . .”).
82.
Bankers Ins. Co. v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 137 F.3d 1293,
1296 (11th Cir. 1998); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 198 (3d
ed. 2006) (reviewing the case law); Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due
Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 987–88 (2014)
(discussing the circuit split between “cursory” and “intermediate” scrutiny of licensing boards); Edlin
& Haw, supra note 36, at 1095 (“[L]icensing boards have become a massive exception to the [Sherman]
Act’s ban on cartels.”).
83.
See, e.g., Earles, 139 F.3d at 1041 (“Despite the fact that the Board is composed entirely of
CPAs who compete in the profession they regulate, the public nature of the Board’s actions means that
there is little danger of a cozy arrangement to restrict competition.”); Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d
1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Oregon State Bar “is a public body, akin to a municipality
for the purposes of the state action exemption,” even though the governing board was comprised
primarily of practicing lawyers); see also Edlin & Haw, supra note 36, at 1125–26 (“Without an opinion
squarely holding a licensing board to antitrust scrutiny, case law such as Hass and Earles has caused
scholars to assume away the possibility of an antitrust suit against a licensing board and to deter litigants
from pursuing such suits.”).
84.
N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1104 (2015) (holding that “[b]ecause a controlling number of
the Board’s decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the Board regulates, the
Board can invoke state-action antitrust immunity only if it was subject to active supervision by the State,
and here that requirement is not met”).
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State agencies controlled by active market participants, who
possess singularly strong private interests, pose the very risk of selfdealing Midcal’s supervision requirement was created to address.
This conclusion does not question the good faith of state officers but
rather is an assessment of the structural risk of market participants’
confusing their own interests with the State’s policy goals.85
The Court explicitly distinguished state regulatory entities controlled by
active market participants, such as bar associations, from municipalities and
other “prototypical state agencies,” noting that Hallie involved “an
electorally accountable municipality with general regulatory powers and no
private price-fixing agenda.”86 Agencies controlled by market participants,
by contrast, “are more similar to private trade associations.”87 Thus, the
Court concluded:
When a State empowers a group of active market participants to
decide who can participate in its market, and on what terms, the need
for supervision is manifest. The Court holds today that a state board
on which a controlling number of decisionmakers are active market
participants in the occupation the board regulates must satisfy
Midcal’s active supervision requirement in order to invoke stateaction antitrust immunity.88
B. Implications for Lawyer Regulation
N.C. Dental has significant implications for lawyer regulation. Most bar
regulatory committees are controlled by active market participants with
little judicial supervision.89 Such committees routinely engage in
anticompetitive conduct without seeking judicial review, such as issuing

85.
Id. at 1114 (citations omitted).
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. (citations omitted).
89.
See Brief of the North Carolina State Bar, the North Carolina Board of Law Examiners, the
West Virginia State Bar, the Nevada State Bar and the Florida Bar, as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-534) (arguing that, without immunity from the
active supervision requirement, bar regulatory committees would face constant challenges for
unsupervised regulation and lawyers would be unwilling to serve for fear of personal liability); Letter
from Robert C. Fellmeth, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Pub. Interest Law et al., to the Hon. Kamala Harris,
Attorney Gen. of the State of Cal. (May 4, 2015) (on file with author) (stating that N.C. Dental “renders
unlawful what has become the common regulatory practice across all 50 states”); see also supra note 16
and accompanying text.
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cease-and-desist letters to non-lawyer competitors90 and issuing ethics
advisory opinions regulating the marketing and delivery of legal services.91
In some cases, bar committees have strategically avoided judicial review
by declining to bring formal action to settle competitive disputes.92 In North
Carolina, for instance, the state bar for years pursued informal regulatory
action against LegalZoom, but declined to seek a judicial decision as to
whether LegalZoom’s business model constituted the unauthorized practice
of law.93 Following the N.C. Dental decision, LegalZoom brought a $10.5
million antitrust lawsuit against the North Carolina State Bar, winning a
consent agreement and statutory language authorizing LegalZoom to
operate in the state.94
TIKD, a technology start-up that offers an app to fight traffic tickets,
recently pursued a similar action against the Florida Bar, arguing that the
bar’s informal campaign against it, coupled with a lack of formal action,
constituted anticompetitive activity in violation of the Sherman Act.95

90.
See, e.g., Brief of LegalZoom.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at
17, N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-534), 2014 WL 3895926 (arguing that the dental board’s
cease-and-desist letter campaign “closely resembled—indeed, was modeled after—the North Carolina
State Bar’s enforcement practices in the legal services market”).
91.
See, e.g., Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 2016-3 (2016); South Carolina
Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. 16-06 (2016); Notice to the Bar, Lawyer Participation in the Avvo Legal
Service Program (June 21, 2017), https://lalegalethics.org/wp-content/uploads/NJ-Opinion-re-Avvo.pdf
?x16384 [https://perma.cc/5555-LFMM] (joint opinion by the New Jersey Advisory Committee on
Professional Ethics, Committee on Attorney Advertising, and Committee on the Unauthorized Practice
of Law); New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Ethics Op. 1132 (2017); see also Brief of
LegalZoom.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 90, at 9 (discussing the use of “informal
opinions” as a regulatory tool by state bars).
92.
See Brief of LegalZoom.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 90, at 20 (describing the
North Carolina bar’s informal efforts to regulate LegalZoom and noting that the “bar took no direct
enforcement action for five years, avoiding judicial review of its action”).
93.
Id.
94.
See Terry Carter, LegalZoom Resolves $10.5M Antitrust Suit Against North Carolina State
Bar, ABA J. (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_resolves_1
0.5m_antitrust_suit_against_north_carolina_state_bar [https://perma.cc/6X9J-JS4D] (discussing the
terms of the consent agreement); Unauthorized Practice of Law Changes, H.B. 436 § 84-2.1, Gen.
Assemb. Sess. 2015 (N.C. 2015), https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2015/Bills/House/PDF/H436v0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28GV-CWR5] (stating that the practice of law does not include the operation of a web
site offering interactive legal software, provided that specified consumer protection standards are met).
95.
See Complaint at 4–5, TIKD Servs. LLC v. Fla. Bar, No. 1:17-cv-24103-MGC (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 8, 2017), 2017 WL 5180986. The Florida Bar took inconsistent positions as to its status under N.C.
Dental and the case was dismissed following a settlement. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Florida Bar Wins
Dismissal of Antitrust Suit Filed by Ticket-Fighting Startup, ABA J. (Dec. 6, 2018, 7:10 AM), http://ww
w.abajournal.com/news/article/florida_bar_wins_dismissal_of_antitrust_suit_filed_by_ticket_fighting
_start [https://perma.cc/MML4-W648] (reporting the dismissal); Amanda Grau, Florida Referee
Releases Report in Favor of TIKD App, RESPONSIVE L. (June 19, 2019), https://www.responsivelaw.org
/blog/florida-referee-releases-report-in-favor-of-tikd-app [https://perma.cc/5AWQ-55GB] (discussing
the inconsistent positions by the Florida Bar and reporting a settlement between TIKD and the Bar on

312

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:297

Notably, the Department of Justice weighed in on TIKD’s behalf.96 Bar
associations in a number of states have suspended informal regulatory
activity to await guidance about what steps are required to avoid antitrust
liability.97
From a doctrinal standpoint, the next question is what counts as “active
supervision” of professional licensing boards. Neither prong of the Midcal
test was in dispute in N.C. Dental. Both parties assumed that the state statute
prohibiting the unauthorized practice of dentistry met the “clear
articulation” requirement, even though the statute did not specifically
mention teeth whitening.98 In general, the clear articulation standard has
been easy to meet.99 Likewise, the dental board did not claim that its
activities were actively supervised by the state;100 the board claimed that, as
a state agency, it was exempt from the active supervision requirement.101

the antitrust claims). Additional challenges are sure to follow. In June 2019, a referee appointed by the
Florida Supreme Court found that TIKD’s operations do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
Fla. Bar v. TIKD Services LLC, Supreme Court Case No. SC2018-149 (2019), https://www.responsivela
w.org/uploads/1/0/8/6/108638213/report_of_referee.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9K4-B8JR].
96.
Press Release, PR Newswire, United States Department of Justice Supports Tech Start-Up
TIKD’s Antitrust Lawsuit Against the Florida Bar (Mar. 13, 2018) (on file with author) (reporting that
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice filed a statement of interest supporting TIKD’s
position that the Florida Bar cannot claim state-action antitrust immunity without proving that it was
acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition and actively supervised by
the state).
97.
See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cohen, Antitrust Liability, Lack of Funding Trouble UPL Regulators,
33 LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 661 (2017) (reporting that, after N.C. Dental, “cease-and-desist
letters make a lot of people nervous” and that many jurisdictions have stopped issuing them); Debra
Cassens Weiss, Washington State Bar Suspends Some Ethics Opinions Because of Antitrust Concerns,
ABA J. (Dec. 21, 2015, 6:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/washington_state_bar_susp
ends_some_ethics_opinions_because_of_antitrust_con [https://perma.cc/48E3-PDQZ] (reporting that
the bar has suspended issuing ethics opinions that could be interpreted as anticompetitive); see also Ala.
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, Chapter 540-X-15 (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.albme.org/Docume
nts/Rules/Temp/540-X-15ER%20repealed.pdf [perma.cc/5M82-8D48] (suspending enforcement of
state telehealth rules in light of antitrust litigation brought against the Texas Medical Board).
98.
N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015) (“The parties have assumed that the clear
articulation requirement is satisfied, and we do the same.”).
99.
See Edlin & Haw, supra note 36, at 1120 (“[T]he Court has made clear that virtually any
colorable claim to state authority” can satisfy the clear articulation test); Safvati, supra note 75, at 1117
(reviewing the case law). “[A] state need not compel an entity to engage in anticompetitive conduct in
order to satisfy the clear-articulation prong. Rather, so long as a policy of anticompetitiveness is
reasonably foreseeable from the state’s delegation of authority, the clear-articulation standard is
satisfied.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
100. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1116 (“The Board does not contend in this Court that its
anticompetitive conduct was actively supervised by the State or that it should receive Parker immunity
on that basis.”).
101. Brief for Petitioner at 6, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015)
(No. 13-534), 2014 WL 2212529, at *6; see also N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1117–18 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“Under Parker, the Sherman Act . . . [does] not apply to state agencies; the North Carolina Board of
Dental Examiners is a state agency; and that is the end of the matter.”).
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Previous cases have largely defined “active supervision” in the negative and
provide little guidance as to the recipe for success.102
The rationale for requiring supervision, however, is “to ensure the States
accept political accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit and
control.”103 In dicta, the N.C. Dental Court suggested a substantive, versus
merely procedural, standard for “active supervision,” identifying the
following elements as “constant requirements”:
The supervisor must review the substance of the anticompetitive
decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce it; the
supervisor must have the power to veto or modify particular decisions
to ensure they accord with state policy; and the “mere potential for
state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the
State.” Further, the state supervisor may not itself be an active market
participant.104
Thus, most commentators read N.C. Dental as tightening the standard for
“active supervision” and signaling the need to produce a record of
substantive, evidence-based review.105 Rebecca Allensworth, for instance,
characterizes N.C. Dental as the culmination of the Supreme Court’s move
away from formalist efforts to define the boundaries of “the state,” in favor
of an accountability test designed to “address[] the inherent capture
[problems] at the heart of modern state regulation.”106 By the logic of
accountability review, she argues, active supervision requires the state to
“attempt to identify and quantify” the anticompetitive effects of regulation

102. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 102–03 (1988) (holding that a state-ordered peer
review program of physicians was not actively supervised because the state could only overturn peerreview decisions for procedural defects); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992) (finding
supervision inadequate because the state did not exercise its power of review); see also N.C. Dental, 135
S. Ct. at 1116 (“[T]he inquiry regarding active supervision is flexible and context-dependent.”);
Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1400 (reviewing the case law). “The ‘active supervision’ cases following
Midcal provided little guidance about what steps states must take in supervising regulation, instead
merely highlighting what is not active supervision.” Id.
103. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1111; see also Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636 (“States must accept political
responsibility for actions they intend to undertake. . . . Federalism serves to assign political
responsibility, not to obscure it.”); Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1405 (discussing the Court’s emphasis
on political accountability as a condition of state-action immunity); Safvati, supra note 75, at 1115
(identifying “financial disinterest and political accountability” as the “bedrock principles that have
shaped Parker immunity doctrine”).
104. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1116–17 (citations omitted) (quoting Ticor, 504 U.S. at 638).
105. See, e.g., Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1413 (stating that “[t]he ‘active supervision’
requirement . . . [was] tightened up by the holding in Ticor and more recently by dicta in NC Dental”);
Merritt, supra note 45 (emphasizing the need to “make a record that justifies the regulatory action”).
106. Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1444.

314

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:297

based on “hard data.”107
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), likewise, focuses on whether the
supervisor has obtained “the information necessary” to “evaluate[] the
substantive merits of the recommended action” and whether “[t]he
supervisor has issued a written decision” explaining the rationale for
regulation.108 Obtaining the information necessary means that “the
supervisor has ascertained relevant facts, collected data, conducted public
hearings, invited and received public comments, investigated market
conditions, conducted studies, and reviewed documentary evidence;” or that
the regulatory board itself has “conducted a suitable public hearing and
collected the relevant information and data.”109
The purpose of these evidentiary requirements is not to create a record
for de novo federal review, as would occur under antitrust law if state-action
immunity were denied.110 The purpose is to show that the state has engaged
in such review, as a condition for state-action immunity.111 Yet lurking
behind the heightened standard for active state supervision is the threat of
federal substantive review. As Allensworth argues, “the careful reader will
find intonations of substantive review in the Court’s antitrust federalism
jurisprudence . . . . It may be that . . . substantive review is next.”112 David
A. Hyman and Shirley Svorny argue that federal courts should be
“exceedingly skeptical”113 about the efficacy of state supervision in the
context of licensing boards “[g]iven the ability of state licensing boards to
‘paper the file’ in advance of any antitrust challenge.”114 They argue that
courts should begin with “a strong presumption that there was not active
supervision” and apply a “quick-look” test, under which the defendant must

107. Id. at 1441.
108. STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION
OF STATE REGULATORY BOARDS CONTROLLED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS 10 (Oct. 2015), https://w
ww.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/active_supervision_of_state_boards.
pdf [https://perma.cc/EX7G-98CQ] [hereinafter FTC STAFF GUIDANCE].
109. Id. (noting that “[t]he information-gathering obligations of the supervisor depend in part upon
the scope of inquiry previously conducted by the regulatory board”).
110. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 36, at 1144 (discussing the application of the “rule of reason”
to professional licensing boards under the Sherman Act).
111. FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 108, at 10 (stating that “a written decision serves an
evidentiary function, demonstrating that the supervisor has undertaken the required meaningful review
of the merits of the state board’s action”); see also Town of Hallie v City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46
(1985) (stating that active supervision serves an “evidentiary function” of “ensuring that the actor is
engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy”).
112. Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1429–30.
113. David. A. Hyman & Shirley Svorny, Response, If Professions are Just “Cartels by Another
Name,” What Should We Do About It?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 111 (2014).
114. Id. at 112–13.
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identify competitive harms and benefits.115
Thus, N.C. Dental has launched a new conversation about the authority
of state bar associations to police their own markets—and the role of state
supreme courts in policing bar regulatory activity. This conversation is
likely to reopen questions about the basis and scope of state courts’ inherent
powers to regulate the practice of law. From a political standpoint, the
organized profession should aim to get ahead of these questions, by making
a credible commitment to evidence-based regulation.
C. ABA Model Regulatory Objectives
The ABA’s 2016 adoption of Model Regulatory Objectives for the
Provision of Legal Services116 represents a potentially pivotal move toward
evidence-based regulation. The objectives were drafted by the ABA
Commission on the Future of Legal Services,117 and adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates after “extended and heated debate.”118 The significance
of their adoption is not fully apparent from the text of regulatory objectives
themselves.119 Most of the objectives—such as “[p]rotection of the

115. Id. at 113 n.64 (quoting Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005));
see also Renee Newman Knake, The Legal Monopoly, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2018) (suggesting a
modified, consumer-based antitrust inquiry akin to the “quick-look” test).
116. See Resolution 105, supra note 38 (adopting the ABA Model Regulatory Objectives for the
Provision of Legal Services).
117. See ABA COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
centers_commissions/commission-on-the-future-of-legal-services.html [https://perma.cc/L4NY-HBS
X] (providing information about the Commission).
118. Laird, supra note 39 (reporting that a voice vote to postpone consideration of the resolution
was too close to call, requiring a count). Delegates voted 276-191 against postponing consideration and
the resolution ultimately was adopted by a voice vote. Id.
119. See Resolution 105, supra note 38. The regulatory objectives are as follows:
A. Protection of the public
B. Advancement of the administration of justice and the rule of law
C. Meaningful access to justice and information about the law, legal issues, and the civil and
criminal justice systems
D. Transparency regarding the nature and scope of legal services to be provided, the credentials
of those who provide them, and the availability of regulatory protections
E. Delivery of affordable and accessible legal services
F. Efficient, competent, and ethical delivery of legal services
G. Protection of privileged and confidential information
H. Independence of professional judgment
I. Accessible civil remedies for negligence and breach of other duties owed, disciplinary
sanctions for misconduct, and advancement of appropriate preventive or wellness programs.
J. Diversity and inclusion among legal services providers and freedom from discrimination for
those receiving legal services and in the justice system
Id.
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public”120 and “[i]ndependence of professional judgment”121—are
uncontroversial, although lawyers may differ about the relative importance
and wording of different objectives.122 Engaging in such discussion is one
of the benefits of defining regulatory objectives.123
The full significance of the objectives also was not apparent from the
debate leading up to the vote, which focused primarily on the implications
for ABA policies prohibiting non-lawyer ownership and provision of legal
services.124 Factions within the ABA have lobbied repeatedly to relax the
rules against non-lawyer ownership,125 and opponents were suspicious that
the regulatory objectives were a cover for market liberalization.126 The
Futures Commission included many proponents of market liberalization,127
and several of the objectives—such as the call for “[m]eaningful access to
justice”128 and the “[d]elivery of affordable and accessible legal
services”129—arguably signal support for this view. Moreover, the
objectives were offered to guide “each state’s highest court” in
“any . . . regulations they may choose to develop concerning non-traditional
legal service providers”130—meaning non-lawyers who currently are
prohibited from offering legal services under ABA policy. To win enough
votes for adoption, proponents had to add an explicit provision stating that
“nothing contained in this Resolution abrogates in any manner existing
ABA policy prohibiting non lawyer ownership of law firms.”131
But while both sides recognized the market subtext of the regulatory

120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
See Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2744 (2012) (charting differences in language and emphasis among various
countries’ regulatory objectives).
123. See Laurel S. Terry, Why Your Jurisdiction Should Consider Jumping on the Regulatory
Objectives Bandwagon, 22 PROF. LAW. 28, 31 (2013) (stating that a “thorough airing of the issues” is
one benefit of defining regulatory objectives).
124. See Laird, supra note 39 (reporting that “[t]he heart of the debate was over whether by
adopting the resolution the House was endorsing the practice of law by nonlawyers”).
125. See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and
Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193 (2010) (reviewing the history of
debate within the ABA about whether to allow non-lawyer ownership and investment in legal services).
126. See Laird, supra note 39.
127. See ABA COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 39, at 61 (“From the outset,
the Commission has been transparent about the broad array of issues it is studying and evaluating,
including those legal services developments that are viewed by some as controversial, threatening, or
undesirable (e.g., alternative business structures).”).
128. Id. at 59.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Resolution 105, supra note 38.
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objectives, neither side explicitly recognized the regulatory subtext.
Regulatory objectives, by their very nature, create a framework for
measurement and assessment. As Laurel S. Terry has written, “without
knowing the underlying objectives of lawyer regulation, one cannot
meaningfully measure whether the regulation succeeds, or is overbroad.”132
Defining regulatory objectives, on the other hand, makes meaningful
measurement possible. Thus, by urging state supreme courts to be guided
by regulatory objectives, the ABA is effectively urging courts to be guided
by factual evidence in assessing the scope and effectiveness of professional
regulation.
Assessing the evidence about “how legal services are delivered” was a
central purpose of the Futures Commission,133 and pointing to evidence of
market changes was integral to its advocacy for the adoption of regulatory
objectives. As the Commission emphasized in its report to the House of
Delegates:
The legal landscape is changing at an unprecedented rate. In 2012,
investors put $66 million dollars into legal service technology
companies. By 2013, that figure was $458 million. One source
indicates that there are well over a thousand legal tech startup
companies currently in existence. Given that these services are
already being offered to the public, the Model Regulatory Objectives
for the Provision of Legal Services will serve as a useful tool for state
supreme courts as they consider how to respond to these changes.134
By emphasizing the de facto expansion of non-lawyer providers, the
Commission sought to motivate state bar associations and courts to be more
proactive and data-driven in considering the regulation of “non-traditional
legal services providers.”135 Commission leaders, such as Andrew Perlman,
Vice-Chair of the Commission, have argued that professional regulation that

132. Terry, supra note 123, at 28.
133. ABA COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 39, at 4, 60 (“The American
Bar Association’s Commission on the Future of Legal Services was created in August 2014 to examine
how legal services are delivered in the U.S. and other countries and to recommend innovations that
improve the delivery of, and the public’s access to, those services.”); see also What We Know and Need
to Know About the Future of Legal Services: White Papers for the ABA Commission on the Future of
Legal Services, 67 S.C. L. REV. 191 (2016) (collection of sixteen white papers assessing recent research
about the delivery of legal services); Chambliss et al., supra note 46, at 195 (stating that the primary
goal of the white papers was to assess “the facts on the ground, insofar as we know them, by presenting
the most recent research on issues of relevance to the Commission”).
134. ABA COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 39, at 60–61 (citations
omitted).
135. Id.
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applies only to lawyers is in danger of becoming increasingly irrelevant to
the regulation of “legal services” more broadly, which demonstrably
involves technology companies and other non-lawyer providers.136 In
England and Wales, market liberalization has come with a loss of
professional regulatory control.137
But the Commission’s appeal to evidence represents more than a shortterm lobbying tactic; it represents a potential paradigm shift in professional
self-regulation—and a potential defense to the loss of professional
regulatory control. Rather than relying on state supreme courts to define and
defend market boundaries based on their “inherent authority” to regulate the
practice of law,138 the passage of regulatory objectives invites state supreme
courts—and bar regulators seeking approval from the courts—to define
market boundaries based on measurable professional objectives; that is,
based on measurement on the profession’s own terms. Viewed this way, the
passage of regulatory objectives, and the evidence-based logic it implies,
represents a path to higher ground—a foundation for maintaining, and
potentially expanding, the profession’s authority over the regulation of legal
services. Moreover, this move from authority-based to evidence-based
regulation is precisely what N.C. Dental demands.
Of course, it is possible that the Model Regulatory Objectives will have
little effect. ABA Commissions come and go and, so far, only three states
have adopted regulatory objectives.139 It is possible, too, that the federal
courts will rein in the muscular approach to “active supervision” signaled
by N.C. Dental, by accepting pro forma evidence of substantive review, or
focusing on structural and procedural, versus substantive, criteria for active
supervision.140

136. Perlman, supra note 42, at 51 (calling for the development of a “broader ‘law of legal
services’ that authorizes, but appropriately regulates,” new forms of service delivery); see also Barton,
supra note 9, at 3088 (predicting that the regulation of lawyers increasingly will “grow less relevant”
given the expanding market for alternative providers).
137. See Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29 (Eng. & Wales) (creating the Legal Services Board, an
independent body responsible for overseeing the regulation of lawyers in England and Wales); LEGAL
SERVS. BD., http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/ [https://perma.cc/PW5G-YBDE].
138. See supra notes 50–60 and accompanying text.
139. See Laurel S. Terry, Examples of Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession (Mar. 2,
2019), https://works.bepress.com/laurel_terry/89/; see also UTAH STATE COURTS, SUPREME COURT
TASK FORCE TO EXAMINE LIMITED LEGAL LICENSING 6 (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.utcourts.gov/com
mittees/limited_legal/Supreme%20Court%20Task%20Force%20to%20Examine%20Limited%20Lega
l%20Licensing.pdf [https://perma.cc/PSF9-R8A8] (referencing the ABA Model Regulatory Objectives
in considering limited licensure).
140. See Richard F. Walker III, Comment, Cavity Filling or Root Canal? How Courts Should
Apply North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 66 EMORY L.J. 443, 451 (2017) (arguing
that courts should narrowly construe N.C. Dental to avoid trammeling states’ rights, especially in the
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But the bar has economic and political incentives to invest in evidencebased policy-making, and the definition of objectives by which the quality
of legal services will be measured, even if the regulatory environment is
slow to change. The American legal profession is facing profound—some
would say existential141—challenges regarding the value of lawyers’
services. Corporate clients are turning to alternative providers for work
previously performed by large law firms.142 Law firm revenues from
individual clients are declining143 and many solo and small law firms are
struggling, due in part to competition from commercial providers and do-ityourself websites and services.144 Many private practitioners are frustrated
with regulators’ resistance to new ways of marketing and delivering legal

context of state health care regulation); Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1432–33 (noting that, although
“[t]he Court is clearly concerned about the substance of state regulation . . . the devil is in the details”);
see also Christopher James Marth, Qualified (Immunity) for Licensing Board Service?, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1473, 1476–77 (2017) (arguing that state licensing board members should be entitled to qualified
immunity for antitrust violations by the board, in order to encourage professional service on licensing
boards).
141. See RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS: HOW
TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS 9 (2015) (arguing that “a wide range
of increasingly capable systems will, in various ways, displace much of the work of traditional
professionals,” including lawyers).
142. See David B. Wilkins & Maria J. Esteban Ferrer, The Integration of Law into Global Business
Solutions: The Rise, Transformation, and Potential Future of the Big Four Accountancy Networks in the
Global Legal Services Market, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 981 (2018) (discussing the “reemergence of the
Big Four” in the global legal market); David B. Wilkins & Maria J. Esteban, Taking the “Alternative”
out of Alternative Legal Service Providers: Remapping the Corporate Legal Ecosystem in the Age of
Integrated Solutions, in NEW SUITS: APPETITE FOR DISRUPTION IN THE LEGAL WORLD (Michele
Destefano & Guenther Dobrauz-Saldapenna eds., forthcoming 2020) (arguing that corporate clients
increasingly seek “integrated” professional services, putting pressure on traditional law firms); Miriam
Rozen, Brand Rankings Show Law Firm Alternatives’ Growing Clout, AM. LAW. (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/02/14/brand-rankings-show-law-firm-alternatives-growin
g-/ (discussing corporate clients’ increasing use of alternative providers, such as media and technology
firms).
143. See Bill Henderson, The Decline of the PeopleLaw Sector, LEGAL EVOLUTION (Nov. 19,
2017), https://www.legalevolution.org/2017/11/decline-peoplelaw-sector-037/ [https://perma.cc/9UKU
-47EH] (discussing the decline in law firm receipts from individual clients); Bill Henderson, Legal
Services and the Consumer Price Index (CPI), LEGAL EVOLUTION (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.legalevo
lution.org/?s=cpi [https://perma.cc/U2ZY-V6MA] [hereinafter Henderson, Legal Services and the
Consumer Price Index (CPI)] (noting that consumer spending on legal services has declined
significantly relative to consumer spending on other goods and services, including other professional
services).
144. CLIO, 2017 LEGAL TRENDS REPORT 5 (2017), https://files.goclio.com/marketo/ebooks/2017Legal-Trends-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY4M-XJX7] (finding that small firm lawyers spend only a
fraction of their day on billable tasks and, on average, spend nearly a third of their day on business
development); THOMSON REUTERS, 2017 STATE OF U.S. SMALL LAW FIRMS 6 (2017), https://legalsoluti
ons.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/news-views/small-law-firm/state-of-small-law-study-2017 [http
s://perma.cc/7QWT-2SZA] (finding that small law firms face increasing competition from do-it-yourself
legal websites and services); Henderson, Legal Services and the Consumer Price Index (CPI), supra
note 143 (discussing the DIY law movement).
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services, and view existing market regulation as a competitive handicap for
lawyers.145
The bar also faces an increasingly organized political challenge from
non-profit providers, researchers, and research foundations concerned about
access to legal information and services in housing, family, financial, and
other matters affecting basic human needs.146 State civil courts are packed
with litigants attempting to navigate without legal assistance147—and those
are the people who make it to court. The vast majority of people with civil
legal problems respond without using lawyers or courts,148 or do nothing at
all.149
These challenges invite the bar to rethink the contours of anticompetitive
regulation even in the absence of regulatory pressure.150 The bar should
welcome comparative research on legal service providers and engage
theoretically to ensure that such research is informed by professional
regulatory objectives. State court and bar leaders should collaborate with
independent researchers to promote new forms of service delivery without
sacrificing consumer protection. The profession needs to identify areas
where provider quality is transparent to consumers, and where it should be
regulated to protect them. For the private bar, the long game in both market
and regulatory battles depends on credible quality claims.151 Such claims, in
turn, require investment in independent, comparative research.

145. See, e.g., ASS’N OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, THE FUTURE OF LAWYERING,
https://aprl.net/aprl-future-of-the-legal-profession-special-committee/ [https://perma.cc/FU8J-4XXS]
(developing proposed amendments to lawyer regulation “so that the profession may both embrace
evolving technology and increase the delivery of competent legal services to the American public, with
full accountability, and without unreasonably restraining competition”).
146. See infra Section II.B.
147. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS,
at iv, vi (2015) (finding that, in 76 percent of nondomestic civil cases, “at least one party was selfrepresented” and that “[t]he idealized picture of an adversarial system in which both parties are
represented by competent attorneys who can assert all legitimate claims and defenses is an illusion”).
148. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: FINDINGS
FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY 11–12 (2014) [hereinafter ACCESSING JUSTICE]
(survey of a random sample of Midwestern adults finding that Americans rarely turn to lawyers or courts
to handle their civil justice problems); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything: Understanding
Moderate Income Households’ Use of Lawyers’ Services, in MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS TO JUSTICE 222,
236 (Anthony Duggan et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Money Isn’t Everything] (discussing the “pervasive
alegality” of Americans’ responses to civil justice problems).
149. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and
Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 112 (Pascoe Pleasence et
al. eds., 2007) (finding that the most common response to non-trivial civil justice problems is to do
nothing, especially among the poor).
150. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Marketing Legal Assistance, 148 DÆDALUS 98, 101 (2019).
151. Id. at 102.
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II. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING RESEARCH
[I]t is one thing to assert there are net benefits from licensing, and
entirely another to prove it.152
The theoretical justification for lawyers’ monopoly over legal services is
the asymmetry of expertise between lawyers and clients, which makes it
difficult for clients to evaluate the quality of professional services.153 As
Talcott Parsons has written:
Among [the] basic characteristics [of the professions] is a level of
special technical competence that must be acquired through formal
training and that necessitates special mechanisms of social control in
relation to the recipients of services because of the “competence gap”
which makes it unlikely that the “layman” can properly evaluate the
quality of such services or the credentials of those who offer them.154
Yet existing research does not support the breadth of lawyers’ monopoly
on these grounds. Corporate clients are sophisticated purchasers of legal
services and capable of evaluating the quality of service in the absence of
fiduciary regulation.155 The rules of professional conduct already
incorporate a series of carve-outs for “sophisticated clients,” allowing
lawyers who serve sophisticated clients greater leeway to contract around
fiduciary protections, for instance against conflicts of interest.156
Even in the consumer market, where individuals and small businesses
may have less experience finding and evaluating legal service providers,157

152. Hyman & Svorny, supra note 113, at 113.
153. See Talcott Parsons, Equality and Inequality in Modern Society, or Social Stratification
Revisited, in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 670
(David B. Grusky ed., 1994).
154. Id. at 679.
155. See David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate AttorneyClient Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2070–72 (2010) (discussing the sophistication of
corporate counsel as purchasers of legal services); Silvia Hodges Silverstein, What We Know and Need
to Know About Legal Procurement, 67 S.C. L. REV. 485 (2016) (discussing the increasing sophistication
of legal procurement by corporate clients).
156. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(regarding advance waivers of conflicts of interest); id. r. 1.8 cmt. 14 (regarding prospective limits on
liability for malpractice). Some large law firms have lobbied for the formalization of this shadow
regulatory regime. See ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, Proposals of Law Firm General Counsel,
Mar. 8, 2011; James Podgers, Ethics 20/20 Pitch: Law Firms That Serve ‘Sophisticated’ Clients Need
Own Regulatory System, ABA J. (Apr. 16, 2011, 11:36 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/et
hics_20_20_pitch_law_firms_that_serve_sophisticated_clients_need_own_regu [https://perma.cc/HB2
7-54F9].
157. See Chambliss, supra note 150, at 100 (discussing obstacles to consumer awareness and use
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there is little evidence to support a total ban on non-lawyer providers. Most
research suggests that non-lawyer specialists are capable of performing
competently and effectively in a variety of contexts, including some types
of formal proceedings.158 Other countries that have opened their legal
markets to non-lawyer owners and investors, and to alternative providers,
such as corporations, technology companies, and authorized non-lawyer
specialists, have experienced no demonstrable ill effects.159 On the contrary,
their regulatory systems, which regulate alternative providers directly, may
be more effective than the U.S. system, which regulates only lawyers.160
This Part reviews research challenging the public benefits of lawyers’
monopoly over legal services, focusing on the consumer market, and calls
upon the bar to respond to this growing evidence-based critique.
A. Lawyers’ Monopoly over the “Practice of Law”
Research on the regulation of the unauthorized practice of law (UPL)
finds significant evidence of political lobbying and protectionism by the

of legal services).
158. See Deborah L. Rhode, What We Know and Need to Know About the Delivery of Legal
Services by Nonlawyers, 67 S.C. L. REV. 429, 432 (2016) (reviewing research on UPL enforcement and
concluding that broad UPL prohibitions “ill serve the public interest”); Levin, supra note 9, at 2613
(reviewing research on the effectiveness of lawyers versus authorized non-lawyer providers and
concluding that there is “scant evidence that lawyers are more effective or trustworthy than nonlawyer
providers of certain legal services”).
159. See DAVID J. MORRIS, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO 12 (2012)
(reviewing the performance of independent paralegals in Ontario); Christine Parker, Peering Over the
Ethical Precipice: Incorporation, Listing and the Ethical Responsibilities of Law Firms 4 (Univ. of
Melbourne, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 339, 2008) (arguing that the ethical dangers opponents
associate with alternative business structures already exist in traditional law firms); Nick Robinson,
When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 46 (2016) (analyzing the impact of alternative business structures in the United
Kingdom and Australia); see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing
Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008)
(arguing that existing anticompetitive regulation imposes high costs on U.S. corporate clients).
160. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 17 (1991)
(calling for the regulation of law firms as entities under the Rules of Professional Conduct); Elizabeth
Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
335 (2003) (calling for law firm regulation by designated in-house compliance specialists); Christine
Parker et al., Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management: An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in
Regulation of the Legal Profession in New South Wales, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 466 (2010) (finding a
significant reduction in consumer complaints as the result of entity regulation).
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bar,161 but little evidence of consumer harm from unauthorized practice,162
outside of a few specific contexts, such as immigration.163 Deborah Rhode’s
1981 national survey of UPL enforcement found that only 2 percent of UPL
investigations arose from consumer complaints and only 11 percent of
reported cases involved evidence of consumer injury.164 A follow-up study,
published in 2016, found that, in 75 percent of cases involving non-lawyer
providers, courts did not even consider the issue of consumer harm.165 Over
two-thirds of officials in charge of UPL enforcement “could not recall an
instance of serious [consumer] injury in the past year.”166 Likewise, most
UPL lawsuits filed against internet providers, such as LegalZoom, are
brought by lawyers or UPL committees without evidence of consumer
harm.167
Comparative research on the performance of authorized non-lawyer
providers finds that non-lawyers are capable of providing competent and
effective legal representation in a variety of contexts, including

161. See Rhode, supra note 15, at 97 (stating that “[a]lmost from conception, the unauthorized
practice movement has been dominated by the wrong people asking the wrong questions”); Rigertas,
Legal Bootleggers, supra note 13, at 67–68 (finding that UPL enforcement activity in the 1930s and
1940s was motivated primarily by the bar’s concerns with the “overcrowding of the profession” and
competition from non-lawyers).
162. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really
Make Good Neighbors—Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 203 n.235 (review of
144 UPL cases reported between 1908 and 1969, finding that only twelve involved a “specific injury”);
Rhode, supra note 15, at 4 (national survey of UPL regulators and analysis of eighty-four UPL cases
reported between 1970 and 1980); Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 2589, 2599 (national survey of UPL
regulators and analysis of 103 UPL cases reported between 2005 and 2015).
163. Rhode, supra note 158, at 438 (noting that immigration is “a field characterized by both
pervasive fraud and pervasive unmet needs,” but calling for regulation versus prohibition of lay
providers). “If the goal is to protect clients from incompetence, rather than lawyers from competition,
then regulation—not prohibition—of lay specialists makes sense.” Id.; see also Emily A. Unger, Solving
Immigration Consultant Fraud Through Expanded Federal Accreditation, 29 LAW & INEQ. 425 (2011)
(calling for expanded accreditation of immigration consultants).
164. Rhode, supra note 15, at 33–34. “Although the bar is actively engaged in unauthorized
practice enforcement in all but seven states, the ABA has never published any comprehensive
description, let alone evaluation, of these activities. Nor has the profession displayed enthusiasm for any
outside scrutiny in this area.” Id. at 4.
165. Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 2604.
166. Id. at 2595. Among those who could recall a serious injury, “almost all singled out
immigration fraud. In the typical case, an undocumented immigrant paid substantial sums and ‘got
nothing done.’” Id. Only 3 percent of reported cases involved immigration, however, suggesting that
such cases may be handled informally, or under fraud and theft statutes. Id. at 2599.
167. Id. at 2605; see also Mathew Rotenberg, Note, Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of
Law and Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 725 (2012) (noting the “conspicuous lack of
alleged harms” in bar complaints against internet legal providers).
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administrative agency hearings;168 labor grievance arbitration;169 family law
matters;170 and immigration appeals.171 In many contexts, formal legal
training is less important than task specialization and experience with the
setting.172 In some studies, non-lawyer specialists significantly
outperformed lawyers.173
There is also little empirical evidence that clients benefit from lawyers’
ethical training or professional regulatory oversight.174 On the contrary,
research on lawyers’ ethical conduct in practice is dominated by a critical
narrative that focuses primarily on lawyers’ departure from the rules of
professional conduct and the lack of effective regulatory oversight.175
Although some researchers have pushed back against this critical narrative

168. See HAZEL GENN & YVETTE GENN, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION AT
TRIBUNALS: REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR 247 (1989) (comparing representation by solicitors
and lay specialists in social security appeals, immigration hearings, industrial tribunals, and mental
health review tribunals); HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT
WORK 76, 108, 148, 190, 201 (1998) (comparing lawyer and non-lawyer representation in
unemployment compensation and state income tax appeals); Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting
Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 765, 777,
785–87 (2003) (comparing representation by solicitors and non-lawyer specialists in welfare benefits,
debt, housing, and employment cases).
169. KRITZER, supra note 168, at 171 (comparing lawyer and non-lawyer representation in labor
grievance arbitration).
170. See THOMAS M. CLARKE & REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE LIMITED LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN PROGRAM 3 (2017) (preliminary evaluation
of Limited License Legal Technicians in Washington State).
171. Unger, supra note 163, at 448 (evaluation of accredited immigration specialists); see also
GENN & GENN, supra note 168, at 83 (comparing solicitors and non-lawyer specialists in U.K.
immigration hearings).
172. GENN & GENN, supra note 168, at 245–47 (finding that specialization was more important
than licensing for effective representation); KRITZER, supra note 168, at 201 (finding that “formal legal
training is less important than substantial experience with the setting”); Moorhead et al., supra note 168,
at 796 (“[S]pecialization is usually more important than legal qualifications in determining the quality
of advocacy.”); CLARKE & SANDEFUR, supra note 170, at 9 (finding that “[f]amily law task competence
was strongly ascribed to specific family law experience as a paralegal”).
173. See Moorhead et al., supra note 168, at 788–89, 795 (finding that non-lawyer specialists in
nonprofit agencies had higher client satisfaction ratings and got significantly better results than
solicitors, at half the cost). But see Anna E. Carpenter et al., Trial and Error: Lawyers and Nonlawyer
Advocates, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1023, 1023 (2017) (studying unemployment insurance appeal
hearings and finding that “while experienced nonlawyers can help parties through their expertise with
common court procedures and basic substantive legal concepts, they are not equipped to challenge
judges on contested issues of substantive or procedural law in individual cases, advance novel legal
claims, or advocate for law reform”).
174. See Levin, supra note 9, at 2622 (reviewing evidence about the effects of law school
socialization, character and fitness review, and lawyer discipline).
175. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Whose Ethics? The Benchmark Problem in Legal Ethics Research,
in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 47, 48 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn
Mather eds., 2012) (discussing the “corruption narrative” in legal ethics research and arguing that the
legal ethics literature is biased toward critical accounts).
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in specific contexts,176 or on theoretical grounds,177 the evidence base for
regulatory benefits to clients and the public is thin.178
B. The Impact of Counsel
The evidence-based critique of lawyers’ monopoly over legal services
has only sharpened as the methodological rigor and theoretical focus of the
research has improved. A new wave of “access to justice” research, in
particular, is gaining national traction and funding, and promises to
dramatically expand reformers’ capacity for evidence-based critique.179
In 2012, D. James Greiner and others began publishing a series of
randomized control trials (RCTs) to assess the impact of representation by
counsel on case outcomes in various types of civil proceedings, compared
to limited legal assistance, information only, or self-help.180 Greiner has
criticized previous research purporting to show the benefits of counsel

176. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 123 (2005) (arguing that critics of self-regulatory efforts by large law firms
rely on “an implicit comparison to a nostalgic, collegial ideal”); Elizabeth Chambliss, The
Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1515, 1564 (2006) (studying law
firm general counsel and finding that “firm counsel serve as a critical resource for many busy but wellintentioned lawyers” who are eager to comply with professional rules).
177. See Chambliss, supra note 175, at 55 (calling for the clarification of normative benchmarks
in legal ethics research); Dana Remus, Hemispheres Apart, a Profession Connected, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2665, 2666 (2014) (arguing that loosening client protections in the consumer market would “place
individual clients at an even greater disadvantage vis-à-vis repeat-player corporate clients”).
178. See Levin, supra note 9, at 2622 (noting that “the bar’s claim that lawyers are more
trustworthy than nonlawyer legal services providers is exceedingly difficult to test”). “This is not to say
that the factors that the legal profession point to as evidence of superior trustworthiness have no
influence on lawyers’ conduct, but rather that the significance of these factors is unproven—and may be
overstated.” Id.
179. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 46, at 101 (observing that “Access to Justice (A2J)
research is in the midst of a renaissance”); Greiner, supra note 46, at 72 (stating that the new empiricism
in access to justice research has much to offer “policy-makers, regulators, funders, reformers, and
revolutionaries”).
180. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118
(2012) (examining the effects of access to representation in unemployment insurance appeals); D. James
Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts
District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter District Court
Study] (examining the effects of access to representation in eviction proceedings); D. James Greiner et
al., How Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A Randomized Experiment in a
Massachusetts Housing Court 5–6 (Univ. of Chi. Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2012), https://ssrn.com/a
bstract=1880078 [hereinafter Housing Court Study] (examining the effects of access to representation
in eviction proceedings); Dalié Jiménez et al., Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress
Using a Randomized Control Trial: A Research and Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 449, 450 (2013) (examining the effectiveness of financial counseling versus a lawyer’s assistance
for people in financial distress).
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because it is based on self-assessment by providers, or after-the-fact
observational studies that do not control for selection bias.181 RCTs, by
contrast, randomly assign cases to different types of service, so as to “assure
(up to statistical uncertainty) that differences observed in the outcomes are
due to the difference in conditions” as opposed to client or case
characteristics.182
Greiner’s research challenges “the bar’s deeply held belief that lawyers
always add value” in civil proceedings.183 The first study randomly assigned
claimants in unemployment insurance appeals to an offer of representation
by a law student, versus no offer, and found that an offer of representation
significantly delayed the proceedings without increasing claimants’
probability of success.184 Given that roughly one-third of claimants were
erroneously denied benefits as an initial matter, and would eventually have
that erroneous denial reversed, the study concluded that claimants “might
have been better off not receiving the . . . offer of assistance.”185
A second set of studies focused on the effects of an offer of
representation from a legal aid lawyer for tenants facing eviction. One study
examined tenants facing eviction in a Massachusetts district court and found
that tenants with access to representation fared better than those randomly
assigned to information and self-help.186 The other study, in a Massachusetts
housing court, found that access to representation had no effect on
outcomes.187
Greiner’s RCTs have provoked intense and sometimes negative
reactions in the legal services community and contributed significantly to
the quality of methodological and theoretical debate.188 For instance: what

181. See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 180, at 2118 (stating that previous research “provides
virtually no credible quantitative information on the effect of an offer of or actual use of legal
representation”).
182. Greiner, supra note 46, at 69; see also D. James Greiner, What We Know and Need to Know
About Outreach and Intake by Legal Services Providers, 67 S.C. L. REV. 287, 293 (2016) (calling for
randomized evaluation of legal aid providers’ outreach and intake programs); D. James Greiner &
Andrea Matthews, Randomized Control Trials in the United States Legal Profession (Harvard Public
Law Working Paper No. 16-06, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2726614 (calling for the use of RCTs to
evaluate the effectiveness of legal interventions).
183. Jeanne Charn, Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for Improving
Access to Legal Services, 122 YALE L.J. 2206, 2221 (2013).
184. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 180, at 2124.
185. Id. at 2125.
186. District Court Study, supra note 180, at 908.
187. Housing Court Study, supra note 180, at 5–6.
188. See Meredith J. Ross, Introduction: Measuring Value, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 67 (introducing a
symposium inspired by Greiner’s research); Charn, supra note 183, at 2221–22 (discussing reactions to
Greiner’s research).
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are the implications of measuring the impact of an offer of representation,
versus actual representation?189 What can RCTs tell us about why
representation matters?190
Meanwhile, Greiner asks: “What would be the effects of partial
deregulation of the U.S. legal profession?”191 Although Greiner states that
his research does not “support the idea that legal services are worthless or
that funding for legal services should be cut,”192 his research clearly poses
a challenge to the bar. In 2016, Greiner launched the Access to Justice Lab
at Harvard Law School, to “combat the resistance within the U.S. Bench
and Bar to rigorous empirical thinking.”193 Funded by the Arnold
Foundation, which champions evidence-based policy-making in other
fields,194 the Access to Justice Lab aims to have twenty-two RCTs
completed or in the field by 2022.195
Rebecca L. Sandefur’s research also challenges professional
assumptions about the value of lawyers and the benefits of representation
when other variables are controlled.196 In 2015, Sandefur published a metaanalysis of forty years of research examining the impact of representation
on adjudicated civil case outcomes in the United States.197 The goal of the

189. See Ross, supra note 188, at 68 (summarizing criticisms of the research design in the initial
RCT); Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 180, at 2129 (explaining that it was neither ethical nor feasible
to randomize actual representation). The correspondence between an offer of representation and actual
representation varied across the three studies. In the study on unemployment insurance appeals, close to
40 percent of claimants who did not receive an offer of representation in fact were represented by other
legal service providers, whereas some claimants who did receive an offer did not make use of it. Greiner
& Pattanayak, supra note 180, at 2128. In the district court eviction study, 97 percent of tenants who
received an offer of representation accepted the offer. District Court Study, supra note 180, at 905. In
the housing court study, over three quarters of the “treated group” experienced full legal representation.
Housing Court Study, supra note 180, at 21.
190. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 46, at 106 (stating that RCTs “can tell us whether or
not representation improves outcomes, but they often provide little information about why representation
mattered”).
191. Greiner, supra note 46, at 72.
192. Id.
193. We Are the A2J Lab, A2J LAB (Sept. 9, 2016), http://a2jlab.org/we-are-the-a2j-lab/ [https://
perma.cc/GE89-DPQH].
194. See EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY, ARNOLD VENTURES, https://www.arnoldventures.org/work/
evidence-based-policy/ [https://perma.cc/V8Q4-GGXJ] (describing evidence-based policy initiatives in
criminal justice, education, health care, and public finance).
195. Vision and Mission, A2J LAB, http://a2jlab.org/vision-and-mission/ [https://perma.cc/NW6
Y-P6QF].
196. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 51 (2010); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise:
Understanding Relational and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 909
(2015) [hereinafter Elements of Professional Expertise].
197. Elements of Professional Expertise, supra note 196, at 912 (explaining the methodology of
meta-analysis).
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analysis was to bring clarity to a literature “bedeviled by a lack of clear
theory and inconsistencies in research design,” in order to get at the question
of why legal representation matters.198
Sandefur found that the impact of representation by a lawyer is “notable
when . . . compared to that of nonlawyer advocates and spectacular when
compared to lay people’s attempts at self-representation.”199 However, in
the kinds of cases studied, lawyers’ impact came primarily from “managing
relatively simple legal procedures” or navigating “rarefied interpersonal”
relationships, rather than from substantive legal knowledge.200 Lawyers’
impact was greatest in high-volume, adversarial settings in which cases are
typically “treated perfunctorily or in an ad hoc fashion by judges, hearing
officers, and clerks.”201 In such contexts, the presence of lawyers appears to
improve case outcomes primarily by encouraging courts to “follow their
own rules.”202 This finding points to state court practices as an important
source of the access to justice problem,203 and challenges the justifications
for lawyers’ monopoly over routine litigation.204
Sandefur’s research also challenges conventional wisdom about
individuals’ demand for lawyers, and the characterization of the access to
justice crisis in terms of access to lawyers.205 Sandefur argues that this
characterization “comes from the bar.”206 Her research finds that most
people with civil justice problems do not characterize their problems as
“legal” and never consider using a lawyer, but rather rely on their own
understanding and support networks to deal with the problem, or do nothing,

198. Id. at 909, 924.
199. Id. at 924.
200. Id. at 926.
201. Id. at 925.
202. Id.
203. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, What We Know and Need to Know About the Legal Needs of the
Public, 67 S.C. L. REV. 443, 456 (2016) (“Some courts are, frankly, lawless: judges and other court staff
behave in ways that are inconsistent with the law’s requirements.”); see also Colleen F. Shanahan &
Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality, 148 DÆDALUS 128, 130 (2019) (arguing
that state civil courts are being asked to address social and economic needs wrought by rising inequality
that they are “neither designed nor equipped to address”); Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in
the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741 (2015) (calling for greater attention to “demand side”
reforms in the lower civil courts).
204. Elements of Professional Expertise, supra note 196, at 926 (“Litigation . . . is at the core of
lawyer’s professional jurisdiction. It is striking, therefore, that only modest levels and only some kinds
of legal expertise may be required in many kinds of ordinary litigation.”).
205. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, 148 DÆDALUS 49, 50 (2019).
206. Id. at 50 (“The definition of the crisis as one of unmet legal need comes from the bar. . . .
Lawyers’ fundamental interest is in maintaining their rights to define and diagnose people’s problems
as legal, and to provide the services that treat them.”).
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even when the potential stakes are high.207 Moreover, the cost of legal
services plays a surprisingly limited role in such decisions.208 The most
common reason that people do not turn to lawyers is that they believe they
already understand their situation and the options for handling it.209
Sometimes people are correct in these judgments and sometimes they are
“disastrously wrong.”210 But Sandefur urges the research community to step
back from the bar’s assumption that people need access to lawyers, and
instead focus on the “empirical question: what assistance do people
need?”211
Sandefur is leading a national effort to advance this research agenda,
with collaborators in academia,212 government,213 and research institutions,
such as the American Bar Foundation,214 the National Science

207. ACCESSING JUSTICE, supra note 148, at 11–12 (finding that individuals rarely turn to lawyers
or courts to handle their civil justice problems); Money Isn’t Everything, supra note 148, at 236
(discussing the “pervasive alegality” of Americans’ responses to civil justice problems); Sandefur, supra
note 149, at 112 (finding that the most common response to non-trivial civil justice problems is to do
nothing, especially among the poor).
208. ACCESSING JUSTICE, supra note 148, at 13 (finding that cost was a reason for not seeking
assistance in only 17 percent of cases); Money Isn’t Everything, supra note 148, at 237 (studying civil
justice problems in moderate-income households and finding that cost was a reason for not seeking legal
assistance in only 6 percent of cases).
209. Sandefur, supra note 205, at 51.
210. Id. at 52.
211. Id. at 50.
212. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What We
Know—and Should Know—About American Pro Bono, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 85 (2013)
(discussing new measurement initiatives in pro bono research); P. Pleasence et al., Apples and Oranges:
An International Comparison of the Public’s Experience of Justiciable Problems and the
Methodological Issues Affecting Comparative Study, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 50 (2016)
(comparative analysis of civil justice research in fifteen different countries); Albiston & Sandefur, supra
note 46, at 103 (calling for “a research agenda that steps back from lawyers and legal institutions to
explore . . . more radical, but potentially more effective, solutions”).
213. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE HOUSE LEGAL AID INTERAGENCY ROUNDTABLE:
CIVIL LEGAL AID RESEARCH WORKSHOP REPORT 48 (2016) (calling for a federal civil legal aid research
agenda); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Paying Down the Civil Justice Data Deficit: Leveraging Existing
National Data Collection, 68 S.C. L. REV. 295, 303–04 (2016) (identifying strategies for using existing
government data to learn more about civil justice issues).
214. See, e.g., REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST
REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT (2011) [hereinafter ACCESS
ACROSS AMERICA]. Sandefur is a Faculty Fellow at the American Bar Foundation, where she founded
and leads the Foundation’s Access to Justice research initiative. See Faculty Fellows: Rebecca Sandefur,
AM. B. FOUND., http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/faculty/profile/31 [https://perma.cc/KHQ9-PK
S5].

330

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:297

Foundation,215 the National Center for State Courts,216 and the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences.217 The goal of these efforts is to build an
evidence base about the most effective and efficient solutions to common
civil justice problems, by identifying where lawyers are needed—and where
they are not. As Sandefur writes:
Resolving justice problems lawfully does not always require
lawyers’ assistance. Evidence shows that only some of the justice
problems experienced by the public benefit from lawyers’ services or
other legal interventions, while others do not. That is because such
intervention is excessive or because it might be the wrong treatment
for the problem. This finding holds true whether the outcome of
interest is benefits to society or benefits to a person with a problem.218
C. The Role of the Bar?
The organized bar is largely absent from this expanding conversation and
poorly equipped to contribute. Most state bar associations have no research
capacity or function.219 Although many collect basic information about their

215. See, e.g., Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 46, at 102 (discussing a 2012 joint ABF-NSF
workshop convening researchers and legal aid providers to develop an A2J research agenda); Awards,
Access to Civil Justice; June 2019 in Chicago, IL, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch
/showAward?AWD_ID=1823791&HistoricalAwards=false
[https://perma.cc/A46M-ASXU]
(announcing a grant to promote A2J scholarship naming Rebecca Sandefur principal investigator and
Alyx Mark and David Udell co-principal investigators).
216. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & THOMAS M. CLARKE, ROLES BEYOND LAWYERS: SUMMARY,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESEARCH REPORT OF AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY COURT
NAVIGATORS PROGRAM AND ITS THREE PILOT PROJECTS (2016) (evaluation of the “appropriateness,
efficacy, and sustainability” of New York City’s Navigator programs); Rebecca L. Sandefur & Thomas
M. Clarke, Designing the Competition: A Future of Roles Beyond Lawyers? The Case of the USA, 67
HASTINGS L.J. 1467 (2016) (suggesting a framework for evaluating the functioning and impact of nonlawyer assistance programs); CLARKE & SANDEFUR, supra note 170 (evaluating the appropriateness,
efficacy, and sustainability of Washington State’s limited licensing program). Thomas M. Clarke is Vice
President of Research and Technology, National Center for State Courts.
217. In 2018, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences launched a new project, “Making
Justice Accessible: Data Collection and Legal Services for Low-Income Americans,” led by Sandefur
and political scientist John Mark Hansen. The goals of the project are to “identify the essential facts that
should be collected about civil justice activity” and to “develop a set of data access standards to help
guide the use of civil justice data for research purposes.” See Data Collection and Legal Services for
Low-Income Americans, AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., https://www.amacad.org/project/data-collection-andlegal-services-low-income-americans [https://perma.cc/7SM7-HXR5] [hereinafter AAAS Data
Project]. The project is one of several related access to justice projects by the Academy. See Making
Justice Accessible: Designing Legal Services for the 21st Century, AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., https://www
.amacad.org/project/making-justice-accessible-designing-legal-services-21st-century [https://perma.cc/
G3WB-WYPV].
218. Sandefur, supra note 205, at 51.
219. Review of state bar websites (on file with author).
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own members, and some publish this information periodically or in annual
reports, only California, Michigan, and Texas have dedicated research staff
beyond a member database specialist.220
Most state disciplinary agencies also lack the capacity221—and
inclination222—to provide systematic data about lawyer disciplinary
activity, much less to proactively commission research to inform state
regulatory policy.223 For instance, while many lawyers view unauthorized
practice as posing a threat to consumers,224 most disciplinary agencies do
not collect data about consumer harm from unauthorized practice, or the
comparative incidence of harm from various authorized forms of service
(such as limited scope services, pro bono services, legal aid, private
practice, and so on).
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, the primary body responsible for drafting and interpreting
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,225 likewise has limited research

220. See Principal Analyst (ORIA) San Francisco/Los Angeles, ST. B. CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.
gov/About-Us/Jobs-Opportunities/San-Francisco/Principal-Analyst-ORIA [https://perma.cc/X9HB-YJ
WY] (stating that the office is responsible for “ensuring excellence, efficiency, accountability and
compliance in State Bar operations, as well as serving as the Bar’s primary source for research and data
analysis”); Research & Reports, ST. B. MICH., https://www.michbar.org/opinions/content [https://perma
.cc/CJP7-QPKW] (providing an index of research on state bar demographics and the economics of law
practice); Research & Analysis, ST. B. TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Re
search_and_Analysis&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=39265 [https://perma.cc/SRU5
-C8NW] (stating that “[t]he Department of Research and Analysis provides research for all State Bar of
Texas departments, committees, and the board of directors,” as well as “for many other audiences like
the media, the public, and our schools”). The Texas State Bar Department of Research and Analysis also
invites “special requests for survey and report generation on data not readily available or normally
collected by the State Bar.” Id.
221. See ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, REPORT TO HOUSE
OF DELEGATES xxii (1991) (finding that disciplinary agencies “have not kept pace with the growth of
the profession”); ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS
(2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2016
sold_results.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YBJ-H45H] (reporting statistics on disciplinary
agencies’ caseloads, staffing, and budget).
222. See Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 1 (2007) (“[I]n many jurisdictions, discipline complaints, discipline files, and even many
discipline sanctions are private. Even states with relatively ‘public’ disciplinary processes shield much
information from the public.”); BARTON, supra note 14, at 138 (observing that attorney discipline is
underfunded and, in most states, “the process is secret”).
223. See Laurel S. Terry, The Power of Lawyer Regulators to Increase Client & Public Protection
Through Adoption of a Proactive Regulation System, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 717, 723 (2016)
(stating that “it is common for the lawyers who regulate lawyers . . . to define their mission in terms of
lawyer discipline, rather than lawyer regulation”).
224. See Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 2593–94 (discussing lawyers’ perceptions of risks to
consumers).
225. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); ABA STANDING COMM.
ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibilit

332

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:297

capacity and no organized research agenda, but rather relies on sporadic
efforts by other ABA committees and special commissions, which in turn
have only incidental attachments to evidence-based policy-making. The
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, which maintains “numerous
resources relating to ethics, professionalism, client protection, [and]
professional discipline,”226 including a national data bank on (public)
lawyer discipline,227 does not have a dedicated research function, but rather
focuses on aggregating existing information and fostering communication
among bar organizations and regulatory agencies.228
Even the ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, which
emphasized the importance of data and research in its findings and
recommendations,229 made no effort to institutionalize evidence-based
policy-making by the ABA. Instead, it lobbied the ABA to establish a
Center for Innovation, to “[e]ncourage and accelerate innovations that
improve the affordability, effectiveness, efficiency, and accessibility of
legal services.”230 Although the ABA has highlighted the Center for
Innovation in executive reports231 and on social media,232 recent budget cuts
and a “massive restructuring”233 of ABA entities mean that future Center
initiatives “depend to a significant degree on philanthropic support.”234

y/committees_commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility.html [https://perma.cc/VSL2-ZM9G]
(discussing the role and activities of the Standing Committee). The ABA House of Delegates has the
ultimate authority to adopt and amend model rules and regulations. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (discussing the House of Delegates’ role).
226. Resources, ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, https://www. americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/resources/ [https://perma.cc/M5P3-KLEH].
227. National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank, ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (Sept. 10,
2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/services/databank/ [https://per
ma.cc/569M-CNFG].
228. Committees and Commissions, ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, https://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ [https://perma.cc/US89-8YK
J].
229. See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.
230. About Us, ABA CTR. FOR INNOVATION, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/centers_com
missions/center-for-innovation/AboutUs/ [https://perma.cc/BRT2-PQF6] (stating the Center’s mission).
231. See, e.g., Jack L. Rives, Embracing Innovation: Adapting to Change is Essential for Law
Practitioners, ABA J. (Feb. 21, 2017, 3:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/embraci
ng_innovation_law_practitioners [https://perma.cc/FP2K-GUMD].
232. See, e.g., ABA CTR. FOR INNOVATION (@ABAInnovation), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/a
bainnovation.
233. Lee Rawles, Massive Restructuring at the ABA Will Rehouse Entities Under 9 Centers, ABA
J. (Apr. 5, 2018, 12:49 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/massive_restructuring_at_the_aba
_will_rehouse_entities_under_9_centers_and [https://perma.cc/9KXJ-LKYY] (announcing a “massive
restructuring” and staff cuts).
234. ABA CTR. FOR INNOVATION, http://abacenterforinnovation.org/about [https://perma.cc/3CL
W-LMB2]; see also Roger Smith, ABA Center for Innovation: A New Kid on the Block Struggling for
Space?, LAW, TECH. & ACCESS TO JUST. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://law-tech-a2j.org/innovation/975/ [https://
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Meanwhile, the American Bar Foundation (ABF), whose mission is to
conduct “rigorous empirical research on law, legal processes, and legal
institutions,”235 is made up of scholars with their own research agendas that,
with the exception of Sandefur’s, only occasionally overlap with questions
about lawyer regulation.236
Yet the bar’s perspective is important for the theoretical development of
evidence-based lawyer regulation. Featherbedding aside, the value of
lawyers’ services and the benefits of fiduciary regulation are not necessarily
intuitive or readily apparent to non-specialists, or even law-trained
researchers.237 Even among lawyers, specialists and non-specialists may
have different perspectives about how the quality of legal services should
be measured and regulated;238 and proponents of market liberalization, too,
remain concerned about service quality and consumer protection from
predatory practices.239 Indeed, in the face of increasing economic inequality
and the use of automated and/or fraudulent processes by lenders and
landlords, concerns about predation-at-scale should be at the top of
researchers’ lists.240
The bar’s investment is also important for increasing research capacity
and access. Researchers benefit enormously from collaboration with legal
service providers, who can facilitate field access and help define questions

perma.cc/V48E-74Z3] (discussing the effects of ABA budget cuts on the Center for Innovation). As a
result of the restructuring, the Center for Innovation is now part of the Center for Access to Justice and
the Profession, along with the Standing Committees on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Professional Discipline, and Legal Aid and Indigent Defense. Rawles, supra note 233.
235. Our Mission, AM. B. FOUND., http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/about/mission.html [h
ttps://perma.cc/QPE7-V8QE].
236. Research Community, AM. B. FOUND., http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/faculty/Rese
archCommunity.html [https://perma.cc/5S5Q-GMWS].
237. See Chambliss, supra note 175, at 55–56 (discussing “the benchmark problem” in legal ethics
research).
238. Id. at 54.
239. See Will Hornsby, CodeX FutureLaw 2014: Ethics, ELAWYERING BLOG (May 16, 2014)
(cautioning proponents of deregulation to “[b]e careful what you wish for” and raising concerns about
industry capture of routine legal services); Perlman, supra note 42, at 103 (discussing the need for
consumer protections under a liberalized regulatory regime).
240. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, The Real Barriers to Access to Justice: A Labor Market
Perspective, LAW & POL. ECON. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/04/02/the-real-barriers-to-acce
ss-to-justice-a-labor-market-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/SK26-EZK3] (“Make lawyers as cheap and
skilled as you want—they can’t help victims access justice if the laws themselves are systematically
slanted against them. The same goes for #legaltech: I expect every innovation to, say, create apps to help
the evicted to be overwhelmed by a tsunami of money backing services like ClickNotices.”); Emily S.
Taylor Poppe, Why Consumer Defendants Lump It, 14 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 149 (2019) (discussing
the causes and consequences of consumer inaction in residential foreclosure proceedings); Jessica K.
Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1579, 1601–02 (discussing
fraudulent practices such as “robo-signing” and “sewer service” by lenders and landlords).
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and priorities for research.241 Providers and regulators, likewise, have much
to gain from independent researchers, who can help define input and
outcome measures, identify blind spots, and secure research funding.242
Critics may be skeptical that the organized bar will embrace independent
research, much less comparative research, which threatens some lawyers’
economic self-interest.243 Social scientists, meanwhile, may discount the
value of “evaluation research,” which takes research questions as given and
therefore is a limited vehicle for theoretical development and critique.244 But
the pressure for evidence-based lawyer regulation is increasing and the
social scientists are at the table. From an advocacy standpoint, the burden
of production has shifted to the bar to support claims about the unique value
of lawyers, based on evidence that is accessible to others, including
competitors and external regulators.
The bar, collectively, has every interest in joining this conversation, by
signaling a normative commitment to evidence-based policy-making and
building the profession’s capacity to contribute to relevant research. Part III
suggests strategies for institutionalizing this commitment and overcoming
regulatory capture within the profession.
III. INSTITUTIONALIZING EVIDENCE-BASED SELF-REGULATION
This Part calls for a paradigm shift in professional self-regulation, from
policy-making based on assumptions about the value of lawyers’ services
to policy-making based on data and research. The first step is a normative
and political one: the profession needs to commit to the idea of evidencebased regulation and begin to turn its attention to what types of data and

241. See Chambliss et al., supra note 46, at 199 (discussing the benefits of collaboration between
researchers and legal service providers and reviewing examples).
242. Id.; see also Abel, supra note 44, at 305 (discussing the benefits of working with nonlawyer
researchers to identify challenges faced by self-represented litigants); SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION
NETWORK, TOUR GUIDE: A SELF-GUIDED TOUR OF YOUR COURTHOUSE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A
SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANT 5 (Apr. 2008) (“[A] judge or administrator may not even observe barriers
that may exist for uninitiated members of the public . . . .”); Margaret Middleton et al., Lessons Learned
by an Interdisciplinary Research Team Evaluating Medical-Legal Partnership with the Department of
Veterans Affairs, 68 S.C. L. REV. 311, 312 (2016) (discussing an interdisciplinary study of medical legal
partnerships funded by the Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation).
243. See Greiner & Matthews, supra note 182, at 2 (arguing that the U.S. legal profession is
“hostile to objective, rigorous, scientific evidence” about the effectiveness of legal services); Deborah
L. Rhode, Professional Integrity and Professional Regulation: Nonlawyer Practice and Nonlawyer
Investment in Law Firms, 39 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 111 (2016) (arguing that the
profession has a fundamental conflict of interest in the regulation of the legal services market).
244. See Austin Sarat & Susan Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 LAW & POL’Y 97, 97–
99 (1988) (urging sociolegal scholars to remain independent from policy makers’ definitions and goals
when framing research questions); Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 46, at 104–05 (calling on access to
justice researchers to move beyond evaluation research).
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research are needed. This means recognizing and promoting the value of
evidence-based policy-making within the institutions responsible for
professional socialization and self-regulation, such as state supreme courts,
law schools, and bar associations.
The profession’s authority over the regulation of legal services also will
require material investments and proactive, sustained collaboration between
bar leaders, regulators, legal services providers, and researchers. State
courts and bar associations are not well positioned to conduct systematic
original research (although some law schools may be). But courts and bar
leaders can work to improve data collection, facilitate researchers’ access to
data, serve as subject matter experts, and educate lawyers about research
findings and debates. Fortunately, national, coordinated efforts to improve
research infrastructure are ongoing and some promising collaborations are
underway.
A. State Supreme Courts
Advancing the normative and political project of “evidence-based
lawyer regulation” depends most immediately on state judicial leadership.
State supreme courts ultimately control the content of professional
regulation and the enforcement of lawyers’ monopoly over the practice of
law. Following N.C. Dental, state supreme courts should provide “active
supervision” of anticompetitive bar activity245 and, more generally, signal
support for an evidence-based, public-spirited approach.
In South Carolina, for instance, while the bar has been aggressive in
challenging commercial providers and opining against lawyers’
participation in new forms of legal marketing,246 the judiciary has been
public-focused in responding to market innovations. In 2012, the South
Carolina Bar mounted a UPL campaign against LegalZoom, but a judicial
referee held that basic document automation does not constitute the

245. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015) (“If a State wants to rely on active market
participants as regulators, it must provide active supervision . . . .”); see supra notes 103–115 (arguing
that the logic of “active supervision” requires substantive, evidence-based review of anticompetitive
regulation).
246. See, e.g., South Carolina Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. 09-10 (2009) (stating that a lawyer who
claims a third party profile becomes responsible for its content, including client comments; but noting
that “[t]his opinion does not take into consideration any constitutional-law issues regarding lawyer
advertising”); South Carolina Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. 16-06 (2016) (stating that a commercial
platform’s “per service marketing fee” for lawyers violates professional rules against fee-sharing with
non-lawyers).
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unauthorized practice of law.247 The Supreme Court of South Carolina’s
most recent UPL decision, concerning the use of document automation in
real estate closings, reflects careful, fact-driven analysis of the potential for
consumer harm and, in the absence of harm, eschews “unnecessary intrusion
in the marketplace.”248 In response to the bar’s proposal to restrict the
commercial delivery of legal forms,249 the Supreme Court sought comments
from experts on legal services delivery250 and declined to adopt the proposed
rule.251
State courts are on the front lines of the access to justice crisis and appear
to be increasingly sympathetic to calls for regulatory reform. Cuts in state
court funding, coupled with increasing consumer distress, have filled state
civil courts with self-represented parties252 and led to experimentation with
new forms of legal assistance. In Washington, for instance, Chief Justice
Barbara Madsen was an early proponent of limited licensing in the family
law context, and provided essential leadership in the creation of a limited
licensing regime.253 In New York, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman
spearheaded a Court Navigator program to provide specialized lay
assistance in New York City housing and civil courts.254 Notably, in both

247. Medlock v. LegalZoom.Com, Inc, No. 2012-208067, 2013 S.C. LEXIS 362, at *16 (Oct. 18,
2013) (“The South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that its ‘duty to regulate the legal profession
is not for the purpose of creating a monopoly for lawyers, or for their economic protection; instead, it is
to protect the public . . . .’” (quoting Linder v. Ins. Claims Consultants, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 612, 622
(2002))).
248. Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 803 S.E.2d 707, 716 (S.C. 2017).
[T]here is no allegation here of fault in connection with any title search, closing, disbursement
or otherwise—Homeowners do not allege they were harmed in any way by the Quicken Loans
model. . . . [W]e believe requiring more attorney involvement in cases such as this would belie
the Court’s oft-stated assertion that UPL rules exist to protect the public, not lawyers.
Id. at 716–17.
249. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
250. Letter from former ABA President William C. Hubbard, to Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of
Court, Supreme Court of S.C. (Aug. 30, 2018) (on file with author); Letter from James J. Sandman,
President of the Legal Servs. Corp., to Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court, Supreme Court of S.C.
(Aug. 29, 2018) (on file with author).
251. Letter from Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court, Supreme Court of S.C., to David Michael
Ross, Exec. Dir., S.C. Bar (Mar. 27, 2019) (on file with author).
252. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 147, at iv (emphasizing the prevalence of
self-represented litigants in state civil courts).
253. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Law School Training for Licensed “Legal Technicians”?
Implications for the Consumer Market, 65 S.C. L. REV. 579, 588 (2014) (discussing Chief Justice
Madsen’s role); Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal Technician Practice
Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 SUPRA 75, 90 (2013) (discussing the Washington State
Bar Association’s objections to limited licensing).
254. See Chambliss, supra note 253, at 592 (discussing the Navigator program and other New
York initiatives to provide access to specialized non-lawyer assistance); JONATHAN LIPPMAN, N.Y.
STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2014: VISION AND ACTION IN OUR MODERN
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states, the courts encouraged independent evaluation of these service
initiatives, providing access and collaborating with researchers about
research questions and design.255
In March 2019, the Supreme Court of Utah announced the formation of
a collaborative working group to test innovative legal service models
through use of a “regulatory sandbox,” which permits innovations to be
tested safely and “generates data to inform the regulatory process.”256 The
goal of the working group is to optimize the regulatory structure for the
delivery of legal services, by considering, among other things:
(1) loosening restrictions on lawyer advertising, solicitation, and fee
arrangements, including referrals and fee sharing; (2) providing for
broad-based investment and participation in business models that
provide legal services to the public, including non-lawyer investment
and ownership of these entities; and (3) creating a regulatory body
under the auspices of the Utah Supreme Court to develop and
implement a risk-based, empirically-grounded regulatory process for
legal services. This body would also, potentially, solicit nontraditional sources of legal services, including non-lawyers, and
allow them to test innovative legal service models and delivery
systems . . . .257
Judicial leaders in other states should pay attention to these
developments and consider strategies for contributing to and coordinating
related efforts. The Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of
State Court Administrators have passed numerous resolutions urging
greater attention to access to justice, including support for “new or modified
court rules and processes that facilitate access.”258 In 2016, the Conference

COURTS 8 (2014), https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/soj2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/FYT5-79QZ]
(announcing the Navigator program).
255. See CLARKE & SANDEFUR, supra note 170 (evaluating the Washington State limited
licensing program); SANDEFUR & CLARKE, supra note 216 (evaluating the New York City Navigator
program).
256. SUPREME COURT OF UTAH, A MOVE TOWARD EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/A-Move-Toward-Equal-Access-3.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/RK4F-HBVU] (announcing the formation of the working group); see also JORGE GABRIEL
JIMÉNEZ & MARGARET HAGAN, A REGULATORY SANDBOX FOR THE INDUSTRY OF LAW 2, http://www.
legalexecutiveinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Regulatory-Sandbox-for-the-Industry-of-Law
.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFW2-QUS8] (calling for “a sandbox approach to regulatory reform that would
allow changes to promote innovation and new business structures that improve access to justice to be
tested safely”).
257. SUPREME COURT OF UTAH, supra note 256.
258. Conference of Chief Justices & Conference of State Court Administrators, Resolution 5,
Reaffirming the Commitment to Meaningful Access to Justice for All, adopted as proposed by the
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of Chief Justices endorsed the ABA Model Regulatory Objectives.259 In a
2019 essay, Chief Justice Nathan L. Hecht of Texas, a self-identified
conservative, calls access to justice “an American idea, not a liberal one or
a conservative one,” and “simply good government.”260
State judicial leaders should also encourage support for state access to
justice commissions, which play an increasingly organized role in civil
justice reform.261 Access to justice commissions have helped to increase
state and private funding for civil legal aid,262 promote evidence-based
program assessment,263 and develop best practices for legal aid funding.264
State judicial leadership plays an important role in promoting access to

CCJ/COSCA Access, Fairness, and Public Trust Committee at the 2015 Annual Meeting, https://www.
ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/access/5%20Meaningful%20Access%20to%20Justice%20for%20A
ll_final.ashx [https://perma.cc/7C6Y-2V4D]; see also Conference of Chief Justices & Conference of
State Court Administrators, Resolution 13, Reaffirming Commitment to Access to Justice Leadership
and Expressing Appreciation for Access to Justice Progress and Collaboration, adopted as proposed by
the CCJ/COSCA Access, Fairness and Public Trust Committee at the 2013 Annual Meeting (July 31,
2013), https://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/microsites/files/ccj/resolutions/07312013-reaffirming-commitment
-justice-leadership-expressing-atj-collaboration-ccj-cosca.ashx
[https://perma.cc/8F4E-M7ZW]
(supporting access to justice commissions); Conference of Chief Justices & Conference of State Court
Administrators, Resolution 4, In Support of the Statement of Best Practices for State Funding of Civil
Legal Aid Prepared by the ABA Resource Center for Access to Justice Initiatives, adopted as proposed
by the CCJ/COSCA Government Affairs Committee and the CCJ/COSCA Access, Fairness, and Public
Trust Committee at the 2015 Annual Meeting, https://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/%20CCJ/R
esolutions/07252015-Support-Statement-Best-Practices-State-Funding-Civil-Legal-Aid.ashx [https://p
erma.cc/58GU-HG5D] (calling for increased state legislative funding for civil legal aid).
259. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 9, Recommending Consideration of ABA Model
Regulatory Objectives for the Provision of Legal Services, adopted as proposed by the CCJ
Professionalism and Competence of the Bar Committee at the Conference of Chief Justices 2016
Midyear Meeting (Feb. 3, 2016), https://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Resolutions/02012
016-Recommending-Consideration-ABA-Model-Regulatory-Objectives-Provision-Legal-Services.ash
x [https://perma.cc/3ZYX-KXUG].
260. Nathan L. Hecht, The Twilight Zone, 148 DÆDALUS 190, 191 (2019).
261. See April Faith-Slaker, Access to Justice Commissions—Accomplishments, Challenges, and
Opportunities, MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J., Fall 2015, at 13 (reporting a “new level of maturity” among
state access to justice commissions and reviewing recent initiatives and accomplishments); Conference
of Chief Justices & Conference of State Court Administrators, Resolution 8, In Support of Access to
Justice Commissions, adopted as proposed by the CCJ/COSCA Access, Fairness and Public Trust
Committee at the 2010 Annual Meeting (July 28, 2010), https://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/C
CJ/Resolutions/07282010-In-Support-of-Access-to-Justice-Commissions.ashx [https://perma.cc/93JC2C84] (recognizing state access to justice commissions as “one of the most important justice-related
developments in the past decade”).
262. See Faith-Slaker, supra note 261, at 13–14 (discussing increases in “state legislative
funding . . . , funding from changes in court rules/statutes . . . and private funding” from the Public
Welfare Foundation, the Kresge Foundation, and the Bauman Foundation).
263. Id. at 14, 16 (discussing commissions’ efforts to promote legal needs assessment and
collaboration with independent researchers).
264. Id. at 17 (citing ABA Resource Center for Access to Justice Initiatives, Supreme Court
Leadership on State Legislative Funding for Civil Legal Aid (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/cont
ent/dam/aba/images/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_SC%20Best%20Practices.pdf).
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justice commissions’ visibility and authority within the bar.265
Researchers such as Greiner and Sandefur already have begun to
collaborate with state and local courts to conduct research on existing
practices and evaluate new service initiatives.266 Clinical law professors,
too, have organized a burst of research on state civil courts and the
experiences of self-represented litigants267 and, as discussed below, may be
especially well positioned to conduct such research.268 However, most state
courts have been slow to develop standards for data collection and research
access. State court case management systems were developed for
operational use, rather than research, and vary widely by jurisdiction,269
making the collection of even basic statistics about the civil justice system
difficult.270 Policies for research access also vary widely, or are non-

265. Id. at 16; see also American Bar Association, Resolution 10D, Report to the House of
Delegates (Aug. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigen
t_defendants/ls_sclaid_atj_aba_atj_resolution.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QL7G-KHHJ]
(calling for the establishment of access to justice commissions in every state and urging ABA member
support).
266. See Current Projects, A2J LAB, https://a2jlab.org/current-projects/ [https://perma.cc/D7473SCJ] (list of ongoing RCTs); CLARKE & SANDEFUR, supra note 170 (evaluation of the Washington
State limited licensing program); SANDEFUR & CLARKE, supra note 216 (evaluation of the New York
City Navigator program).
267. See Anna E. Carpenter et al., Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 249
(calling for research on state civil courts and judges and providing a theoretical framework); Anna E.
Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647 (2017) (studying judicial
approaches to “active judging” to assist pro se litigants); Colleen F. Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom:
Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Access to Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 215 (studying pre-hearing
procedures in unemployment insurance appeals and finding significant variations among judges); Jessica
K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a Problem-Solving Housing
Court, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1058 (2017) (studying an experimental problem-solving housing court
and suggesting that inquisitorial procedures may improve substantive justice for pro se litigants); Jessica
K. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1579 (2018) (urging the
expansion of the problem-solving model in the rental housing and consumer debt contexts); Carpenter
et al., supra note 173, at 1023 (studying lawyer and nonlawyer representation of employers in
unemployment insurance appeals and finding that “judges play a critical role in shaping nonlawyer legal
expertise”); see also Tonya L. Brito et al., “I Do For My Kids”: Negotiating Race and Racial Inequality
in Family Court, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027, 3029 (2015) (reporting findings from a study of the role
of counsel in civil contempt proceedings).
268. See Jessica K. Steinberg, Law School Clinics and the Untapped Potential of the Court Watch,
6 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY 176, 185 (2018) (promoting the “court watch” as a “signature research
method” for clinics).
269. See Sandefur, supra note 213, at 297 n.6 (stating that “different jurisdictions collect different
information, record the same information in ways that make comparisons difficult, and many still do not
keep sufficiently detailed electronic case records”).
270. Id. at 296–97 (“One of the most striking facts about civil justice in the United States is how
few solid representative facts we have about it. . . . We do not and cannot presently know how many
civil cases are filed in the United States in a given year. . . . what groups in the population are involved
in which types of cases, how the cases are resolved, and with what outcomes for whom.”); SRLN Brief:
How Many SRLs? (SRLN 2019), SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK (May 25, 2019), https://www.srl
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existent, leaving researchers to negotiate access on a court-by-court,
project-by-project basis.
The National Center for State Courts, the National Science Foundation,
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and other organizations are
actively working to improve state court data collection,271 create standards
for research access,272 and leverage existing administrative data.273 State
judicial leaders should support these efforts and encourage their states to
implement standards for data collection and access. Judicial leaders should
also engage with cybersecurity experts to implement privacy protections
and best practices for data governance.274
B. Law Schools
Law schools are another important site for advancing the normative and
long-term, material project of evidence-based lawyer regulation. An
obvious place to begin is with the professional responsibility curriculum.
Many leading professional responsibility scholars are critical of the breadth
of lawyers’ monopoly and call for systematic research to guide professional
regulation.275 However, in most law schools, the required course on

n.org/node/548/srln-brief-how-many-srls-srln-2015 [https://perma.cc/E3TK-YRUJ] (“While the
National Center for State Courts has developed a counting methodology for the courts, it is extremely
difficult to implement for a variety of reasons, with the most notable being it requires a customization
of a court’s case management system.”).
271. See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 1
(2019), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/State%20Court%20Guide%20to
%20Statistical%20Reporting.ashx [https://perma.cc/X6YV-VF66] (providing a “standardized reporting
framework for state court caseload statistics designed to promote intelligent comparisons among state
courts”); NCSC Launches National Court Open Data Standards Project, @ THE CTR.: THE FLAGSHIP
NEWSL. OF NCSC (July 10, 2018), https://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/at-the-Center/2018/Jul-10.aspx [htt
ps://perma.cc/SF9Q-YBZK] (project to develop a uniform data standard to “foster more consistent and
reliable data collection, lead to better data quality, lower court costs, and enable faster and more reliable
data access”).
272. See AAAS Data Project, supra note 217 (project to develop standards and templates for
research access).
273. See, e.g., Workshop: Computing, Information Science and Access to Justice, NAT’L SCI.
FOUND., https://nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1839537&HistoricalAwards=false [https
://perma.cc/7W35-DWZS] (convening researchers, data scientists, and legal service providers to discuss
the application of computing methods in access to justice research); see generally Andrew M. Penner &
Kenneth A. Dodge, Using Administrative Data for Social Science and Policy, 5 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND.
J. SOC. SCI. 1, 2 (2019) (noting that “efforts to leverage administrative data in the social sciences are
uneven”).
274. See Brian J. McLaughlin, Cybersecurity: Protecting Court Data Assets, in TRENDS IN STATE
COURTS: COURTS AND SOCIETY 67 (Deborah W. Smith et al. eds., 2018) (discussing best practices for
data-governance by state court administrators).
275. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 159, at 1690–91 (reviewing decades of “withering critiques”
from professional responsibility scholars); Levin, supra note 9, at 2615 (finding little empirical evidence
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professional responsibility—like the ABA Model Rules for Professional
Conduct—focuses on the regulation of lawyers’ individual conduct and
devotes little coverage to empirical questions or broader regulatory
debates.276
The ABA curricular requirement for professional responsibility
instruction is likewise narrow—and headed in the wrong direction. The
relevant standard is Standard 303, which currently reads as follows:
(a) A law school shall offer a curriculum that requires each student to
satisfactorily complete at least the following: (1) one course of at
least two credit hours in professional responsibility that includes
substantial instruction in rules of professional conduct, and the values
and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members . . . .277
Standard 303 used to require “substantial instruction in the history, goals,
structure, rules of professional conduct, and the values, and responsibilities
of the legal profession and its members.”278 However, in 2017, the ABA
dropped the language about “history, goals, [and] structure”—words that
suggest an empirical framework and some reflection on regulatory
objectives—in favor of a narrow focus on existing rules and values.279
This narrow focus is seriously at odds with the realities of the legal
market and current regulatory challenges and debates.280 Law students need
to be exposed to these debates if they are to act as competent stewards of

to support lawyers’ monopoly claims); Rhode, supra note 158, at 439 (decrying the lack of systematic
research on key regulatory issues).
276. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, a Case Study, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 817, 821–22 (2000) (criticizing the individualistic focus of the required professional
responsibility course and calling for more attention to broader regulatory debates); E-mail from Donald
K. Joseph to author (June 18, 2018, 2:38 PM) (on file with author) (reporting the results of a survey of
ABA-accredited law schools, finding that 77 percent allow class sizes of more than sixty students in the
required professional responsibility course, which may limit coverage of material beyond that required
to pass the MPRE).
277. ABA, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 16
(2018).
278. Memorandum from Barry A. Currier, Managing Dir. of Accreditation and Legal Educ., to
Interested Persons and Entities (Feb. 23, 2017) (on file with author), https://www.americanbar.org/conte
nt/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutio
ns/March2017CouncilOpenSessionMaterials/2017_february%20notice_revisions_to_standards_rules.p
df [https://perma.cc/CT2S-X2QC] (redlined version of the amended Standards).
279. Id.
280. See Chambliss, supra note 276, at 819–22 (arguing that a narrow focus on the ABA Model
Rules provides a distorted empirical picture of the profession and professional regulation); Perlman,
supra note 42, at 51 (arguing that the current lawyer-based regulatory framework needs to be
reimagined).
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the profession over the course of their careers.281 Students should be taught
to recognize the empirical assumptions underlying existing rules, not just
about the boundaries of lawyers’ monopoly—the focus of this Article—but
also about confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege,282 conflicts of
interest,283 lawyer advertising,284 and other core subjects of professional
regulation.
Professional responsibility also should introduce students to the norms
of independent research and the difference between evidence in advocacy
and evidence in social science. This is a tricky and interesting subject with
a long history in the social sciences;285 but it is also a “professional
responsibility” issue that relates directly to the profession’s own rules
requiring professional independence and the avoidance of conflicts of
interest.286 Researchers are expected to be impartial, specify questions and

281. Chambliss, supra note 276, at 822 (“[B]y making the individual [lawyer] the unit of analysis,
the traditional approach leaves out a whole set of ‘professional responsibilities’ having to do with the
stewardship of the profession and its institutions and organizations.”); see also Andrew M. Perlman, The
Public’s Unmet Need for Legal Services & What Law Schools Can Do About It, 148 DÆDALUS 75, 75–
76 (2019) (stating that “law schools have not prepared students to deliver legal services as efficiently as
possible,” but rather have trained them to engage in “highly customized and expensive forms of
lawyering”).
282. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (noting that the rationale for the privilege rests on empirical assumptions about clients’ need for
lawyers and the effects of the privilege on client disclosure); Notes and Comments, Functional Overlap
Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications
Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1232 (1962) (finding that lawyers are more likely than non-lawyers to
believe that the privilege encourages client disclosure and that most non-lawyers are unaware of the
scope of the privilege); Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the
Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 200–01 (1989) (questioning the value of the privilege as an
inducement to candor in “communications between house counsel and corporate employees” and calling
for more attention to “the need for lawyers to warn corporate employees that the corporation's attorneyclient privilege does not belong to them personally”).
283. See, e.g., SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL
PRACTICE (2002) (studying how lawyers manage conflicts of interest in a random sample of 128 Illinois
law firms); Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the Practice
of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87 (2003) (studying how lawyers manage conflicts of
interest compared to other fiduciaries, such as accountants, psychotherapists, physicians, journalists, and
academics).
284. See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee Cost
Paradox, 65 STAN. L. REV. 633, 692 (2013) (study challenging assumptions about the effects of
advertising on fees in the contingency fee context, finding that “contingency fee clients are, for a number
of reasons, uniquely insensitive” to price); Jim Hawkins & Renee Knake, The Behavioral Economics of
Lawyer Advertising: An Empirical Assessment, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1005, 1014 (noting that “lawyer
advertising restrictions are adopted with minimal or no serious empirical study about the actual impact
on the market for legal services”).
285. See Chambliss, supra note 47, at 34 (discussing epistemological debates within the social
sciences and their relevance for empirical legal scholarship).
286. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (discussing the
professional independence of a lawyer); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N
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methods in advance, separate factual from normative claims, and make their
data available to others.287 Providing an introduction to these norms—
perhaps in conjunction with coverage of N.C. Dental and the increasing
pressure for evidence-based lawyer regulation—would help students learn
to distinguish between instrumental and inquisitive analysis,288 and to
recognize the importance of “professional” (i.e. independent) research.289
Professional responsibility scholars interested in promoting evidencebased lawyer regulation should promote organized changes in the
professional responsibility curriculum, including the language of Standard
303. Making a change in the formal standard—perhaps simply by requiring
coverage of “regulatory objectives”—would signal the profession’s
commitment to self-reflection about self-regulation and establish a foothold
for research guided by professional regulatory objectives.
Law school clinics are also a natural setting for introducing students to
evidence-based program assessment and the value and limits of different
methods of measuring the impact of legal assistance. Students should be
exposed to the reporting requirements for grant-funded clinics and the
increasing use of cost-benefit analysis in legal aid advocacy.290 Clinical
professors should invite students to think critically—and constructively—
about how to measure the value of legal services to clients, government, and
the public; and how to communicate these benefits to attract partners, raise
money, and drive policy change.291
Law school clinics are also promising partners for original research on
legal services delivery.292 Like teaching hospitals, they are well positioned
to identify important research questions, facilitate access to client
communities, and collaborate with experienced researchers in academic

2018) (discussing conflicts of interest).
287. See Greiner, supra note 46, at 68 (discussing “general norms of social science research”).
288. See Greiner & Matthews, supra note 182, at 12 (arguing that lawyers are trained to be
instrumental, as opposed to inquisitive, resulting in a resistance to acknowledging empirical
uncertainty).
289. See Chambliss et al., supra note 46, at 200 (emphasizing the need for “professional
(independent, trained) researchers” in access to justice research).
290. See, e.g., REPORT OF STOUT RISIUS ROSS, INC., THE FINANCIAL COST AND BENEFITS OF
ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN EVICTION PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTRO 214-A, at 3 (2016)
(concluding that establishing a right to counsel for tenants in New York City “would provide a net cost
savings to the city of $320 million”).
291. See Chambliss, supra note 150, at 102 (calling on lawyers to “make a business case to
consumers and to related service providers, such as health care providers, state and local governments,
and court administrators”).
292. See Jeanne Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Lab Office, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 145, 146
(discussing “the potential for law school clinics to serve as sites of empirical research to answer pressing
questions about delivery of legal services in low-income communities”).
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institutions.293 Court-centered clinics are especially well positioned to
conduct “court watch” projects—observation and data-collection in the
courtroom—a uniquely valuable method of access to justice research.294
Law students can be trained to meaningfully contribute to well-defined
court watch projects,295 with important pedagogical as well as research
benefits.296
Like professional responsibility teaching, clinical teaching is directly
concerned with promoting the quality and efficacy of legal services, and
clinical professors have been at the forefront of calls for evidence-based
lawyer regulation.297 In 2003, the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) Section on Clinical Legal Education established the Bellow
Scholars Program to support clinical research on legal services delivery and
collaborations between clinicians and social science researchers.298 Many
former Bellow Scholars continue to be active in conducting research,299 and
the field is growing as more law schools establish tenure-track positions for
clinicians.300

293. Id. at 161.
294. See Steinberg, supra note 268, at 187 (discussing the unique value of courtroom observation
and in-court data collection in access to justice research); see also Brito, supra note 267, at 3031
(discussing the role of courtroom observations in a mixed-methods study of the impact of counsel in
child support enforcement proceedings); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Turner in the Trenches: A Study of How
Turner v. Rogers Affected Child Support Contempt Proceedings, 25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
75, 77 (2017) (discussing court observation studies of child support contempt proceedings in South
Carolina).
295. Steinberg, supra note 268, at 186–87 (“Law students are not equipped to carry out complex
data collection . . . . [b]ut . . . can certainly partake in courtroom observations and record the presence or
absence of a handful of variables.”); see also Enrique S. Pumar & Faith Mullen, The Plural of Anecdote
is Not Data: Teaching Law Students Basic Survey Methodology to Improve Access to Justice in
Unemployment Insurance Appeals, 16 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 17 (2012) (describing student training and
contributions in a study of unemployment compensation appeals).
296. See Steinberg, supra note 268, at 190–95 (discussing the benefits of “see one, do one, teach
one” pedagogy, and learning to think critically about legal institutions and roles).
297. See JEFFREY SELBIN ET AL., ACCESS TO EVIDENCE: HOW AN EVIDENCE-BASED DELIVERY
SYSTEM CAN IMPROVE LEGAL AID FOR LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME AMERICANS 3 (2011) (calling
on the federal government to support evidence-based approaches to civil legal assistance); Abel, supra
note 44, at 299 (proposing a metric for measuring the effectiveness of access to justice interventions);
Charn, supra note 183, at 2226 (calling for “consumer-centered, evidence-based legal services”); Charn
& Selbin, supra note 292, at 168 (discussing the political and ethical challenges of moving toward
evidence-based legal services).
298. BELLOW SCHOLAR PROGRAM, https://sites.google.com/view/bellowscholars/home [https://p
erma.cc/CQ4H-7FDV].
299. See Scholarship by Former Bellow Scholars, BELLOW SCHOLAR PROGRAM, https://site
s.google.com/view/bellowscholars/scholars-and-selection/scholarship-by-bellow-scholars [https://perm
a.cc/CQQ6-BW6Z].
300. See, e.g., New Voices in Civil Justice Workshop, VAND. L. SCH., https://law.vanderbilt.edu/
academics/academic-programs/branstetter/new-voices-in-civil-justice-workshop.php [https://perma.cc/
LEB5-VJBD] (describing a workshop for junior scholars writing about civil justice, recently featuring a
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In addition to clinics, a number of law schools have established research
and training centers focusing on access to justice and innovations in legal
services delivery. Stanford Law School was an early leader in research on
access to justice301 and, in 2013, established a research and training center
on legal design.302 Chicago-Kent College of Law’s Center for Access to
Justice & Technology has been a leader in the development and testing of
self-help legal software.303 In 2014, the National Center for Access to
Justice, now at Fordham Law School, launched the Justice Index, an annual
benchmarking tool that provides “a visual and data-based picture of the
quality of access to justice in state justice systems.”304 In 2016, as discussed
above,305 Harvard Law School established a research center to test the
effects of specific legal interventions using randomized control trials.306
And numerous other law schools have launched related research and
training programs in recent years.307 Law deans should support research and

number of clinical scholars doing empirical research); Congratulations to the 2017 ASPIRE Grant
Recipients, U. S.C. OFFICE VICE-PRESIDENT FOR RES., https://www.sc.edu/about/offices_and_divisions/
research/news_and_pubs/news/2017/20170428_ASPIRE_Recipients_Announcement.php [https://perm
a.cc/H7D2-NLM5] (announcing an interdisciplinary study of juvenile court intake “to promote the
integration of empirical inquiry into policy analysis”).
301. See Stanford Center on the Legal Profession, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/stanfo
rd-center-on-the-legal-profession/ [https://perma.cc/2XTP-MNFZ] (stating that the Center was founded
in 2008 to support “research, teaching, programs and public policy initiatives on crucial issues facing
the bar” such as access to justice and lawyer regulation); see also Mark Childress, Programs of Change:
Law Schools Explain Their Commitment to Public Service, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA
(Oct. 25, 2011, 5:58 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/10/25/programs-changelaw-schools-explain-their-commitment-public-service [https://perma.cc/VX6T-3F96] (reporting on a
U.S. Department of Justice Access to Justice Initiative honoring Stanford law professor Deborah Rhode
as a “champion of change”).
302. See Legal Design Lab, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/organizations/pages/legal-des
ign-lab/ [https://perma.cc/QGF3-Z5SA]; About, LEGAL DESIGN LAB, http://www.legaltechdesign.com/a
bout/ [https://perma.cc/V8RF-EHC5] (“The Legal Design Lab . . . was founded in fall 2013 to bring
designers, lawyers & technologists together to advance legal innovation and access to justice.”); see also
Margaret Hagan, Design Comes to the Law School, in MODERNISING LEGAL EDUCATION 202, 220
(Catrina Denvir ed., forthcoming 2020) (discussing the role of the design lab as a partner in research).
303. Center for Access to Justice & Technology, CHI.-KENT C. L., https://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/i
nstitutes-ceters/center-for-access-to-justice-and-technology/history
[https://perma.cc/4BAN-K7YL]
(chronicling the development of A2J Author, a widely-used self-help document assembly software).
304. National Center for Access to Justice Launches Justice Index, NAT’L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO
JUST., https://ncforaj.org/2014/03/04/national-center-for-access-to-justice-launches-justice-index/ [http
s://perma.cc/Q2ZU-88NS]. The Center moved from Cardozo Law School to Fordham Law School in
2016. See We’re Moving—NCAJ Heading to Fordham Law School!, NAT’L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST.,
https://ncforaj.org/2016/08/01/were-moving-ncaj-heading-to-fordham-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/9
RFY-4DU9].
305. See supra notes 193–195 and accompanying text.
306. See Access to Justice Lab at Harvard Law School, A2J LAB, https://a2jlab.org/ [https://per
ma.cc/GTN8-AKUZ].
307. See, e.g., Center for Access to Justice, GA. ST. U.C.L., https://law.gsu.edu/faculty-centers/
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training programs focused on legal services delivery and pitch such
programs to applicants and donors as a means of preparing lawyers for a
changing legal market.308 The AALS and affiliated faculty should look for
ways to coordinate their research and regulatory policy agendas.
C. Bar Associations
Finally, bar leadership will be critical in shaping the profession’s
response to market and regulatory changes and the development of the
profession’s capacity for evidence-based regulation. Some professional
groups already are active in efforts to rethink lawyer regulation based on
empirical data. For instance, the Association of Professional Responsibility
Lawyers (APRL) recently led an effort to clarify and streamline the ABA
Model Rules governing lawyer advertising,309 based on a state-by-state
survey of current enforcement practices and complaints.310 As a follow-up,

center-for-access-to-justice/ [https://perma.cc/FT6H-KW3U]; CIV. JUST. RES. INITIATIVE, https://civilju
sticeinitiative.org/ [https://perma.cc/FT6H-KW3U] (describing a collaboration between Berkeley Law
and UC Irvine School of Law); Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, U. DENVER,
https://iaals.du.edu/ [https://perma.cc/9AHM-RV9J]; Boot Camp, INST. FOR FUTURE L. PRAC., https://w
ww.futurelawpractice.org/bootcamp [https://perma.cc/GX35-PC9M] (describing a collaboration among
law schools and employers to expand law training in “complementary disciplines, including business,
design, project management, technology, and data analytics”); Legal Innovation & Technology,
SUFFOLK U.L. SCH., https://www.suffolk.edu/law/academics-clinics/concentrations/legal-innovation-te
chnology [https://perma.cc/6877-JLCE]; Iron Tech Lawyer, INST. FOR TECH. L. & POL’Y GEO. L., https:/
/www.georgetowntech.org/itlabout [https://perma.cc/AB9U-HB8L]; L. WITHOUT WALLS, http://lawwit
houtwalls.org/ [https://perma.cc/73QV-5Q2L] (part-virtual, collaborative training program hosted by
University of Miami School of Law); LegalRnD Lab, MICH. S.U. COLL. L., https://www.law.msu.edu/la
wtech/legal-rnd-lab.html [https://perma.cc/M8C2-UYCE]; NMR&S Center on Professionalism, U.S.C.
SCH. L., http://professionalism.law.sc.edu/ [https://perma.cc/4FZL-NK3T]; Program on Law &
Innovation, VAND. L. SCH., https://law.vanderbilt.edu/academics/academic-programs/law-and-innovati
on/index.php [https://perma.cc/A38R-X7QK]; see also Law School Innovation Index, LEGAL SERVS.
INNOVATION INDEX, https://www.legaltechinnovation.com/law-school-index/ [https://perma.cc/6K5E99LG] (identifying law school programs focusing on innovation in legal services delivery).
308. See William D. Henderson, The Lawyer of the Future: A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L.
REV. 461, 465, 503–04 (2013) (noting that building a curriculum based on labor market data and
feedback from employers can be “the basis for a successful law school capital campaign”); Perlman,
supra note 281, at 76 (calling upon law schools to train students to “deliver services efficiently,” by
teaching business skills, project management, design thinking, and data analytics).
309. See Scott Flaherty, ABA Clarifies Rules on Lawyer Advertising (Sort of), AM. LAW. (Aug. 9,
2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/08/09/ethics-update-on-lawyer-ads-moveaba-rules-toward-clarity/?slreturn=20190106100924 (reporting ABA approval of amendments
“clarifying” and “condensing” the rules on advertising and solicitation but avoiding “murky questions”
arising from online marketing platforms).
310. APRL, 2015 REPORT OF THE REGULATION OF LAWYER ADVERTISING COMMITTEE 3 (June
22, 2015), http://aprl.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/APRL_2015_Lawyer-Advertising-Report_06-22
-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE2G-RGJL] (describing the survey). The survey found that state enforcement
of advertising rules varies considerably. Most complaints about lawyer advertising come from
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APRL has launched a broader project on the “Future of Lawyering” to
tackle the rules governing unauthorized practice, online lawyer marketing,
and non-lawyer investment in legal services;311 and has reached out to
researchers and alternative providers for input and data.312
The State Bar of California, likewise, has created a task force to identify
possible regulatory changes to improve the delivery of legal services
through the use of technology, including artificial intelligence and online
legal service delivery models.313 The task force will review the consumer
protection purposes and impact of current UPL prohibitions; evaluate
existing regulation governing lawyer advertising, solicitation, and fee
splitting; and prepare a recommendation as to whether the State Bar “should
consider increasing access to legal services by individual consumers by . . .
permitting non lawyer ownership.”314 As part of this effort, the State Bar
commissioned an independent research report to lay the groundwork for the
task force’s work.315
Meanwhile, several states are actively considering proposals to regulate
online document providers. In Washington, for instance, the Practice of Law
Board has proposed amendments to the definition of the “practice of law”
to explicitly allow online document provision under certain conditions,
including provider registration with the state bar.316 The proposed
amendments are structured so that the court would “retain control of the
scope of the exception,” thus “keeping authority over the practice of law

competitors rather than clients and there is “virtually no empirical data demonstrating actual consumer
harm caused by lawyer advertising.” Id. at 27.
311. See The Future of Lawyering, ASS’N PROF. RESP. LAW., https://aprl.net/aprl-future-of-the-le
gal-profession-special-committee/ [https://perma.cc/8TS8-WGSG] (stating that the goal of the project
is to develop proposals for “amending the legal ethics rules and reforming the lawyer regulatory process”
to respond to the “evolving nature of technology and its impact on the delivery of legal services and
access to justice”).
312. See id. (providing a link to the roster of participants).
313. See Task Force on Access Through Innovation of Legal Services, ST. B. CAL., http://www.c
albar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Committees-Commissions/Task-Force-on-Access-Through-Inno
vation-of-Legal-Services [https://perma.cc/88D8-QMUT] (reporting the creation of a task force
“charged with identifying possible regulatory changes to enhance the delivery of, and access to, legal
services”).
314. Id.
315. See WILLIAM D. HENDERSON, LEGAL MARKET LANDSCAPE REPORT (July 2018), http://boa
rd.calbar.ca.gov/docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem1000022382.pdf [https://perma.cc/96TV-NYKY],
Attachment A; Laurel Terry, Back to the Future (Again) Regarding the Regulation of Legal Services,
JOTWELL, at 1 (Apr. 18, 2019) (reviewing HENDERSON, supra note 315) (describing the report as “jampacked with data” and a must-read for “anyone who is concerned about access to legal services and the
proper scope of lawyer regulation”).
316. See In re Suggested Amendments to GR 24—Definition of Practice of Law, Order No.
25700-A-1255 (Nov. 28, 2018) (on file with author).
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with the judicial branch.”317 Tennessee also is considering an amendment to
its statutory definition of the practice of law to make clear that the “practice
of law” includes “the generation of legal documents for valuable
consideration by means of interactive software,” and to require provider
registration.318 At the national level, the New York State Bar Association
and New York County Bar Association are leading an effort to draft model
regulation of online document providers for consideration by the ABA in
August 2019 (“Resolution 10A”).319
These efforts are controversial both with traditionalists, who view
commercial legal software as a threat to consumers,320 and with some legal
tech entrepreneurs, who view the regulation of legal software as
incompatible with the First Amendment.321 Numerous bar groups have
weighed in to urge restraint and further study.322 Currently, however, there
is no systematic research to inform the debate.
These regulatory issues deserve national, organized attention and
research support. ABA leaders should use their platform to promote states’
adoption of the ABA Model Regulatory Objectives, and make explicit the
demand for a paradigm shift in professional self-regulation.323 The ABA
should provide leadership and resources to promote national data sharing
and evidence-based policy-making about specific regulatory issues, and

317. Id. at 6.
318. H.B. 1411 Amended, 111th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2019) (on file with author).
319. See Lorelei Laird & Jason Tashea, Proposed Model Rules for Online Legal Document
Companies Go Back to the Drawing Board, ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2019, 3:40 PM), http://www.abajournal.com
/news/article/model-rules-for-online-legal-document-companies-withdrawn/ [https://perma.cc/9NZV-R
RUT] (discussing the formation of a working group to edit the guidelines for presentation in August
2019).
320. Id. (noting that two prior iterations of the proposal have been withdrawn due to concerns
about warranties, intellectual property, dispute resolution, and whether the proposed guidelines would
apply to courts offering online forms); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
321. See Richard S. Granat, Call for an Association for the Advancement of Legal Product,
RICHARDGRANAT.COM (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.richardgranat.com/single-post/2019/03/26/Callfor-an-Association-for-the-Advancement-of-Legal-Product [https://perma.cc/8LRJ-LMS9] (explaining
his opposition to Resolution 10A and arguing that such efforts will be the “death knell of the emerging
consumer-facing digital application industry”); see also Marc Lauritsen, Are We Free to Code the Law?,
56 COMM. ACM 60 (Aug. 2013), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571acb59e707ebff3074f461/t/5
946f665bf629ad759f22b07/1497822826191/AreWeFree.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CB6Z-U6PF]
(questioning whether restricting the distribution of interactive legal software is within the legitimate
scope of government action).
322. Summary of Points/Positions in Opposition to Resolution 10A (on file with author).
323. ABA President-Elect Judy Perry Martinez served as chair of the ABA Commission on the
Future of Legal Services and was a chief proponent for the adoption of regulatory objectives. See Judy
Perry Martinez, ABA (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/leadership/aba_officers/jud
y-perry-martinez.html [https://perma.cc/GPV8-FMBC] (discussing Perry’s prior leadership and service
within the ABA).
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develop a proactive research agenda guided by professional regulatory
objectives.324 ABA leaders should work with regulators, researchers,
consumer advocates, and funders to organize and support such research.
The U.S. legal profession lags well behind legal professions in other
Anglo-American jurisdictions, such as Australia, Canada, and Britain, in
institutionalizing empirical research as part of professional self-regulation.
In New South Wales, for instance, an early study of self-assessment by
entity providers found a dramatic reduction in client complaints and paved
the way for regulatory reform throughout Australia and Canada.325 The
Solicitors Regulatory Authority (SRA), the primary authority for the
regulation of solicitors in England and Wales, maintains a research staff of
fourteen, who proactively design and conduct research to guide regulatory
policy.326
The ABA should use the occasion of its recent reorganization to promote
evidence-based policy-making for the benefit of its members as well as the
public. Many lawyers and law firms could profit from new models for
service provision and marketing, collaboration with technology companies,
and the ability to raise outside capital. The challenge is to develop new
models without sacrificing consumer protection. Building research capacity
is essential for promoting professional regulatory objectives in an
expanding legal market.
CONCLUSION
The United States is moving toward evidence-based lawyer regulation.
The seeds were sown in 2015, when the Supreme Court narrowed the scope
of state-action antitrust immunity for professional licensing boards, and
2016, when the American Bar Association adopted Model Regulatory
Objectives for the Provision of Legal Services. These developments create

324. See Laurel S. Terry, Globalization and the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20: Reflections on
Missed Opportunities and the Road Not Taken, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 95, 118–20 (2014) (stating that “if
the ABA wants to continue to be relevant and useful to its members and to U.S. regulators,” it should
strive to serve as an “early warning system” for difficult lawyer regulation issues, aggregate relevant
information, and facilitate national and global conversations about lawyer regulation).
325. See Christine Parker & Lyn Aitken, The Queensland “Workplace Culture Check”: Learning
from Reflection on Ethics Inside Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 399 (2011) (describing the study);
Terry, supra note 223, at 727 (discussing the study and its impact throughout Australia and Canada).
326. See, e.g., David Bish & Debra Malpass, Price Transparency in the Legal Services Market: A
Behavioural Trial Exploring the Effect of Price Information on Consumer Decision Making (June 13,
2018) (paper presented at the International Conference on Access to Justice in London); George
Hawkins & Mijanur Rashid, Using Insurance Claims Data to Determine Appropriate Levels of Public
Protection in a Regulated Market (June 13, 2018) (paper presented at the International Conference on
Access to Justice in London); see also SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., supra note 43 (providing an
index of recent research).
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pressure for empirical evidence to assess the costs and benefits of lawyers’
monopoly over legal services.
But who will conduct the research necessary for an “evidence-based”
approach? What methodological standards will govern? And what role will
the organized profession play in the theoretical development of the field?
The profession historically has played a minimal role in assessing the costs
and benefits of anticompetitive regulation and faced little pressure to do so.
Now, the profession is on the defensive as market—and regulatory—
competitors emerge.
This Article has argued that the profession is losing its authority over the
regulation of legal services, and called upon state judicial leaders, law
schools, and bar associations to respond. Professional self-regulation has
many critics and most evidence suggests the boundaries of lawyers’ current
monopoly are overbroad. Yet, fiduciary values and provider experience are
critical components of any system redesign. The profession has a
responsibility to engage in the growing national research conversation about
access to justice, and to expand its commitment to evidence-based lawyer
regulation.

